



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
1700 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1700

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SAIG-JAR

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. Army Freedom of Information Office, Records Management & Declassification Agency, ATTN: Ms. Sasha Ward, 7701 Telegraph Road, Casey Building, RM 150, Alexandria, VA 22315-3860

SUBJECT: FOIA Reading Room Posting of Frequently Requested IG Record

1. As required by the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552, (a)(2)(D), request the enclosed IG report be posted in your FOIA reading room. This report documenting Senior Official Misconduct has been requested for release to the public at least three times under the FOIA, and is or will likely become the subject of subsequent requests.

Document

Subject

Keywords

ROI 16-00052

MG Grigsby

Engaged in an inappropriate relationship

2. We will notify your office when to remove this report from the reading room.

3. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please call me or Ms. Broyles at (703) 545-4591.

MARGARET F. THOMAS
Deputy Legal Advisor

Encl



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**US ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL AGENCY
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (ROI)
(Case 16-00052)**

NAMES / POSITIONS:

Major General (MG) Wayne W. Grigsby, former Commanding General (CG), 1st Infantry Division (1ID), Fort Riley, KS

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

ALLEGATION / FINDING #1: The allegation that MG Grigsby engaged in an inappropriate relationship was substantiated.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

BACKGROUND:

1. On 27 April 2016, the Department of the Army Inspector General Agency (DAIG) received an anonymous complaint that MG Grigsby showed unusual interest in a female CPT. The DAIG conducted a preliminary inquiry into this matter in DAIG case #16- 00033. The report concluded that, while MG Grigsby's actions did not rise to the level of violating a standard, his interaction with the CPT had created a perception of preferential treatment. The DAIG notified MG Grigsby of the findings of the inquiry on 27 July 2016. The closure letter to MG Grigsby, signed by MG Leslie Smith, Deputy The Inspector General, notified MG Grigsby of a perception created by his mentoring style, especially with female officers. The investigation identified (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) as the female officer that received unusual attention from MG Grigsby; however, the closure letter to MG Grigsby did not name her.

2. On 2 September 2016, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) received an anonymous complaint that alleged an inappropriate relationship between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C), a CPT (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). The DAIG initiated a preliminary review of the complaint and opened case #16-00052 on 2 September 2016. On 15 September 2016, the DODIG forwarded another complaint against MG Grigsby. This complaint, filed on 14 September 2016, had a named complainant and provided significant details and investigative leads. The DAIG interviewed the complainant on 19 September 2016, and determined an investigation was warranted.

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3. On 21 September 2016, The Inspector General (TIG) directed an investigation by DAIG.

[Investigating Officer (IO) Note: On 16 September 2016, Lieutenant General David Quantock, TIG, verbally directed DAIG-IN to conduct an investigation into the allegation against MG Grigsby. He signed the formal directive on 21 September 2016.]

4. General Robert B. Abrams, CG, U.S. Army Forces Command, suspended MG Grigsby from command on 22 September 2016, and relieved him from command for loss of confidence on 26 September 2016.

SCOPE: In this investigation, we interviewed five witnesses who worked in the 11D command group. The DAIG strategy was to minimize the impact on the unit by limiting interviews to those in the best position to directly observe MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). The DAIG determined that there was no need for additional witness testimony after the initial (b) witness interviews. The witness testimonies combined with documentary evidence provided sufficient, consistent evidence to establish a preponderance of evidence. MG Grigsby declined to be interviewed, but submitted a statement to DAIG through his attorney. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) declined to interview and did not provide a statement. We reviewed government emails, government phone records, documents, and photographic evidence provided by witnesses during the investigation, and the applicable standard. As the allegations concerned an inappropriate relationship between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C), this report addresses the evidence, analysis, and conclusions against MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) together.

ALLEGATIONS: MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) engaged in an inappropriate relationship.

STANDARD: Army Regulation (AR) 600-20 (Army Command Policy), 6 November 2014, states in paragraph 4-14b, that "all relationships between Soldiers of different grade are prohibited if they—(1) Compromise, or appear to compromise, the integrity of supervisory authority or the chain of command, (2) Cause actual or perceived partiality or unfairness, (3) Involve, or appear to involve, the improper use of grade or position for personal gain, (4) Are, or are perceived to be, exploitative or coercive in nature, (5) Create an actual or clearly predictable adverse impact on discipline, authority, morale, or the ability of the command to accomplish its mission." Paragraph 4-14e further states: "All military personnel share the responsibility for maintaining professional relationships. However, in any relationship between Soldiers of different grade or rank, the senior member is generally in the best position to terminate or limit the extent of the relationship. Nevertheless, all members may be held accountable for relationships that violate this policy."

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DOCUMENTS / TESTIMONY:

1. The DAIG case #16-00033 did not substantiate the allegation that MG Grigsby demonstrated preferential treatment towards a subordinate. The investigation concluded that there were rumors and perceptions of preferential treatment of (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) by MG Grigsby; however, the evidence did not support a determination that the interactions were based on anything other than the recognition of (b)(6) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) superior performance and demonstrated professional potential. MG Grigsby's actions did not rise to the level of violating a standard. The investigation also found that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) former Chief of Staff, 11D, spoke to MG Grigsby about the perceptions created by his interactions with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and MG Grigsby modified his mentoring style and spent less one on one time with mentored officers. The evidence further indicated that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was a very competent and talented officer. Her highly rated experience with tactical sustainment at the National Training Center (NTC) provided her the credibility to play a key role in the G-4 office and in 11D command exercises.

2. DODIG complaint, 2 September 2016, alleged that MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) had an inappropriate relationship. The anonymous complainant was not certain if the relationship had progressed to a physical relationship, but stated that the relationship was widely known. The complainant noted frequent visits by (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) to MG Grigsby's office, casual/flirtatious conversations between them, frequent telephone calls or texting, and a report of a photograph of MG Grigsby's truck parked in (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) garage. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Finally, the complainant provided names of additional personnel who might have information regarding the inappropriate relationship.

[IO Note: The DAIG requested MG Grigsby's and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) government phone records after receiving this complaint to determine if there was adequate evidence to warrant further investigation. The DAIG also located the Twitter posts and included them as exhibits to this report. Although the DAIG communicated with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) she was not available for an interview. Therefore, the DAIG will not speculate on her reason for posting these messages.]

3. DODIG complaint, 14 September 2016, indicated (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) submitted the hotline complaint. The complaint alleged MG Grigsby was having an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate member of his staff, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Many personnel in the division believed it was sexual. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) The complaint provided details of several messages allegedly sent between MG Grigsby, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) The complaint mentioned

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that MG Grigsby often communicated on a white cell phone, but none of the staff had the number to that phone. The complaint also included photos of a pickup truck allegedly belonging to MG Grigsby parked in what was alleged to be (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) garage. Finally, the complaint noted that several members of the division staff, brigade staffs, and spouses often asked if anything was going on between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

4. On 19 September 2016, DAIG interviewed (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and confirmed that he had submitted the DODIG hotline complaint on 14 September 2016. He indicated that he submitted the complaint because he was concerned that MG Grigsby seemed distracted and not focused on the unit's mission and upcoming deployment to Iraq. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) testified:

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) He filed the IG complaint because he thought MG Grigsby lacked focus on a day-to-day basis. He saw the relationship with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) affecting the CG's decision-making, and, without providing any specificity, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) stated that he was pretty sure the CG's relationship with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was affecting careers. He did not want it to get to the point where it was affecting lives.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

c. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) MG Grigsby, sent (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) a screen shot of the email message, dated 27 July 2016, from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) to MG Grigsby, which (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) mentioned in (b) complaint. The background of the message involved discussions about which forward operating base (FOB) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) would be stationed at during the upcoming deployment to Iraq. Members of the staff did not want (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) assigned to the same FOB as MG Grigsby. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Chief of Staff, 11D, made the final decision not to co-locate (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and MG Grigsby. Prior to the decision, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) wrote to MG Grigsby:

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

MG Grigsby replied in part:

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...as discussed, you are good...your success is more important to me.

[IO Note: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) provided DAIG the screen shot image of the message and it is included as an exhibit to this report.]

d. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) saw the email, dated 3 August 2016, from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) to MG Grigsby, which (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) mentioned in his complaint on MG Grigsby's iPad. MG Grigsby had left his iPad on the front seat of a Humvee during a deployment to the NTC. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was retrieving something from the Humvee and noticed a message titled, "Household Goods", and decided to check the message since MG Grigsby was arranging to have his household goods picked up. The email stated: "No way Sir, It's your staff's job to protect you. By the way, House hold goods get picked up 19 September."

[IO Note: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) did not save a copy of the message. The DAIG did not locate this message during its review of MG Grigsby's government emails.]

e. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) developed a trusting relationship with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) after initially accusing him of enabling MG Grigsby's relationship with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) confided in him. They talked about the "burner phone," which was a white phone that MG Grigsby had. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) MG Grigsby did not give the number out to anyone, not even (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) or the other general officers in the 11D had the number. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) suspected MG Grigsby used the phone to talk to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Finally, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) told him that he felt awkward while on a helicopter ride with only MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) during a training exercise.

f. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) stated he believed that on 12 August 2016 MG Grigsby called (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) five times. He provided this information to show they talked frequently, even while MG Grigsby was at a live fire exercise at NTC. "Every time I turned around, he would call her." When MG Grigsby called his wife on the iPad, he did not use earphones and you could hear the conversation. When he called (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) he used earphones. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) also noted that when MG Grigsby called a member of the staff, he was indifferent to who was standing nearby. When MG Grigsby made other calls, he stepped away from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) or asked people to step out of a vehicle. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) assumed these calls were to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

¹ FaceTime is a proprietary video telephony product developed by Apple Inc. for use on iPhones and iPads. FaceTime supports both audio and video messaging. The screen shot is an exhibit to this report.

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5. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) testified:

a. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) He described the relationship between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) as more than a professional relationship due to the amount of phone and message contact, and the casualness between the two. About two weeks after becoming the (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) he began to notice that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) would come up to the command group quite often just to stop in, either to say, "Hey", or to brief MG Grigsby on sustainment operations. MG Grigsby commented that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was one of the officers he mentored and that she really helped him out with sustainment. His suspicions were raised because (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) the G-4, rarely came to the command group to brief the CG, and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was the most frequent visitor of the five mentored officers. People in the command group commented that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was "up here quite a lot." Although he did not recall precisely when, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) stated that he brought his concerns to the new chief of staff, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) He stated that other staff members had brought this issue up to him, and he was concerned as well.

b. He considered the relationship between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) "weird," and believed there was an attraction between the two of them. He provided several situations to support his assessment:

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

[IO Note: This TDY trip took place during the period MG Grigsby did not have a government phone.]

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(3) On multiple occasions during Warfighter exercises (WFX), he found MG Grigsby in the Army Logistics Operations Center (ALOC), either talking one-on-one to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) or talking to a small group that included (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). If MG Grigsby visited the ALOC and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was not there, he would enter, turn around, and leave. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was on one of the logistics teams. During staff exercises, MG Grigsby favored that team, "He's always on that side of the JOC (joint operations center)."

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(7) He believed that MG Grigsby was in contact with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) every day during the entire NTC rotation. The CG had his iPad with him, and he was sending messages the whole time they were out there. There were several times that his iPad stayed open, for example, when he got out of the Humvee. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) noticed that a lot of the emails were sent to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). One night (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) confronted (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and accused him of enabling the relationship between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) told (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) that he was not, and that he was concerned.

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(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

c. He knew of three occasions when (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) had sent messages to members of the staff claiming that MG Grigsby could be thinking about hurting himself. He had never seen any direct message of this type from MG Grigsby. On the first occasion, the (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) told him she saw a message on an iPad that was on the counter in (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) kitchen. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) discussed this with the chaplain because he knew MG Grigsby and the chaplain had a close relationship. The second event occurred while the unit was at NTC. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

[IO Note: The DAIG determined that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) sworn testimony regarding his conversation with the (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) which the (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) had with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) in the context of their official duties, was credible. The DAIG determined it was not necessary to interview the enlisted aide (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) so as to minimize the impact on the enlisted support staff to the CG.]

d. Regarding an incident that occurred the evening of 14 August 2016, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) The CSM told him that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) apparently had FaceTimed MG Grigsby on his iPad. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) reported that it looked like MG Grigsby accidentally answered it, that he was in his underwear, and he appeared to be in someone else's house. MG Grigsby immediately hung up. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) claimed that MG Grigsby was at (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) house. The CSM quoted (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) message as "[MG Grigsby] has been (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) since October." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) tried to call MG Grigsby back, but he did not answer. She then called the CSM to determine if MG Grigsby was home. The CSM called (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) because he lived closer to the CG. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) got a call from the XO at approximately 2030 hours because (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) had contacted the XO repeating what she told the CSM earlier. The XO asked if (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) had seen or spoken to the CG. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded he had not. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) texted him twice that night asking for the CSM's phone number. After the second text around 2100 hours, he contacted the CSM, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) The CSM messaged him about 2130 hours stating he had just talked to the CG, and he appeared to be in his truck, in his driveway. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) believed

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(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

e. On 19 September 2016, the XO showed him an email MG Grigsby had forwarded to him. The subject line read, "Major General Grigsby stop (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). The body of the email said, "BCC will only get bigger until you do." He suspected (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) showed him the email because they had previously discussed concerns with the relationship between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

g. The CSM and the Chief of Staff had talked to the CG about his relationship with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). They told him flat out that there was a very serious perception out there; "people are talking about it, you need to stop." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) observations after these warnings were, "that just force[d] them underground a little bit more. They don't stop.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

6. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

He testified:

a. He first heard the rumors concerning MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) in March or April 2016 when he was in brigade command. He was told of a rumor within the division staff that there was something going on between the CG and a female CPT in the G-4 section. He heard similar rumors when he became the Chief of Staff. No one ever gave him any specific information, and he told the officers who discussed this issue with him that there was not much he could do with second or third hand information, or with innuendo.

b. Regarding the assignment of (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) to a different FOB, he assigned 90% of the personnel to the FOBs. He made the decision to put (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) in Erbil, partially because of the perception of her relationship with MG Grigsby, and partially

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because he needed a strong G-4 officer there. MG Grigsby told him that he wanted (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) at Union 3, because he did not want to break up the battle staff. He told MG Grigsby that he should split the battle staff and get (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) to Erbil for the good of the organization. MG Grigsby was not pleased, but he accepted the decision.

[IO Note: MG Grigsby's primary duty location was Union 3.]

c. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) called him a few days before the unit came back from NTC looking for guidance regarding communications he received from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) asked (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) to go and check on MG Grigsby because (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) said the CG had made reference to hurting himself. He told (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) to immediately check on the CG, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) did, and reported back that MG Grigsby was fine. The CSM later told him that MG Grigsby was doing well, the CSM and the CG were out for physical training, and they had a great day of training. He was aware of previous arguments between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). He believed they often argued about the type of relationship between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). There was a lot of concern regarding the alleged relationship; however, no one had any information regarding the possible relationship, except communications and information provided by (b)(6);(b)(7)(C).

[IO Note: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) did not deploy with the unit to NTC.]

d. Regarding not being able to locate MG Grigsby on 14 August 2016 following redeployment from NTC, either the Aide or the XO called him and said they just got a message from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C).

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) About an hour later, he got a call (from either the XO or the Aide) that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) tried to FaceTime MG Grigsby and he immediately hung up. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) MG Grigsby location was unknown for a few hours. He discussed this issue with the XO and the CSM the next day. They were all dumbfounded. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) the staff checked things out, and everything seemed okay. There was speculation in the conversations the next day regarding whether (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was involved with MG Grigsby being unaccounted for, but no one had any evidence of her involvement.

e. He knew the Division Chaplain and the CSM had talked to the CG about the comments of self-harm he allegedly made to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) also discussed his concerns with BG Patrick Frank, Deputy CG, but again there were just rumors and no facts to present. He did not know if BG Frank discussed the concerns with MG Grigsby. BG Frank lived next door to MG Grigsby, and told (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) that he noticed that MG Grigsby's car was missing for extended periods of time on several evenings. BG Frank asked him about that, and MG Grigsby told him he would go out to check gates in the evening.

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f. He believed there was an inappropriate relationship between the CG and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) had completely open dialogue with the CG that a CPT usually did not have in that type of organization. He could not comment on whether or not the relationship was sexual in nature as he did not have information either way and did not want to speculate.

7. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) testified:

a. He recalled discussing with DAIG in May 2016 his observations of interactions between MG Grigsby and staff sections, officers, and female officers. At that time he had not noticed any unusual activity. Following that conversation, he began to pay more attention to his surroundings. While he had not noticed anything unusual prior to the first IG call, upon reflection and observation, he noted that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was "always around." She was a (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and the CG was interested in logistics. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and other junior officers participated in small groups in preparation for WFX. He never saw MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) one-on-one. MG Grigsby did like to give feedback to junior officers, so he did not think anything about their interaction was unusual.

b. The (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) brought him some concerns shortly after he talked to the IG. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) mentioned a perception that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and MG Grigsby could be too close; he was around her too much. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) also mentioned that MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) seemed to text, message, and talk a lot. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) met with MG Grigsby in his office soon after and told him there was a perception that he was getting a little too close to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). MG Grigsby got defensive, and said he was close to a lot of officers. MG Grigsby was the type of officer who talked to a lot of people. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) agreed, but told him he needed to be careful because there was a perception that he was spending too much time with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). After some discussion, MG Grigsby said, "Roger," and thanked him.

c. About a week and a half later, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) went to the gym on a weekend afternoon. He went up to the top floor of the gym and saw MG Grigsby working out with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). He was taken aback as he had already mentioned his concern to MG Grigsby. MG Grigsby asked him to join them, but he said no thanks. Two days later, he and the CG were outside at work, and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) brought up the fact that, although they had already talked about concerns with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) he found them working out a few days later. MG Grigsby said he was working out and she came up to him. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) reminded him there was a perception problem. MG Grigsby again "Roger" the comment. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) thought that would be the end of it. MG Grigsby told him there was nothing going on, and took the advice pretty well.

d. About two weeks later (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) called him into the office and presented his own concerns regarding MG Grigsby "hanging out" with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

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(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) told him several officers had brought the issue to him, mentioning the constant texting and communications sent by (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) MG Grigsby had previously shared with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) that his marriage over the years was contentious. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) wondered if his discussions with MG Grigsby were effective, and if this was residual from previous activities. He told (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) that he had discussed the issue with MG Grigsby and he had acknowledged the situation. He did not know if (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) had discussed the issue with MG Grigsby.

e. He did not notice any unusual interaction between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) after that. A few weeks later, during a TDY at Fort Leavenworth, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) told him that the CG had decided he was going to replace (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) the CAG, with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) told (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) "hell no, that's not going to happen." He told (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) he would talk to the CG about it. A few days later he mentioned to MG Grigsby that "this has got to stop." He had discussed it with him before, and "now you want to bring (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) up to the CAG position." He told MG Grigsby that "you cannot be around her at all. You are on a slippery slope of getting yourself in trouble." It was a fairly emotional conversation. They also discussed moving (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) from Union 3 to Erbil. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) told MG Grigsby that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) had relayed to him that MG Grigsby said no to that move. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) told MG Grigsby that she had to be at Erbil, at a different FOB from him, to prevent accidental meetings with her. The next day, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) presented the laydown for the deployment that listed (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) at Erbil, and the CG blessed off on it. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) felt he had done his job of protecting the CG.

f. He discussed another incident that occurred during a pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) to Iraq. At the very end of a video tele-conference from Iraq to Fort Riley, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) came right up to the camera and may have said something, although he did not know what she may have said. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) told the CG what (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) did. MG Grigsby said he had not noticed, but (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) told him everybody noticed, and it was that kind of stuff that would keep people talking.

g. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

called (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) when he got that message and asked him to check if MG Grigsby was home. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) called him back and said the CG was not home. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) tried to call MG Grigsby a few times with no success. MG Grigsby eventually FaceTimed him about two hours later and appeared to be in his truck in his driveway. He told MG Grigsby that the actions of the evening were not helpful to his

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situation. MG Grigsby told him he had turned off his phone [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

h. [REDACTED] told him that there was a video of MG Grigsby's vehicle at [REDACTED] house. He had not seen the video, but the information shocked him. He wanted to believe the MG Grigsby would never do anything like that, but where there was smoke, there was fire – and there was a lot of smoke.

i. He was frustrated because he felt he was direct with MG Grigsby about what he was hearing, and tried to protect him. He was surprised that this situation was not resolved. He continued to work with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to keep MG Grigsby away from [REDACTED]. He did not want to speculate on the nature of the relationship, but if the CG's vehicle was at [REDACTED] house, that was inappropriate, at least an inappropriate closeness. He did not want to speculate on a sexual relationship; no one had mentioned that.

j. At no time did he think MG Grigsby was incapable of leading the Division [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] MG Grigsby told him that he felt sometimes he had sacrificed his family for his career. MG Grigsby did a good job separating his personal life from his work life. In his view, the perception of the relationship with [REDACTED] was what impacted others and their ability to do their jobs.

8. [REDACTED] testified:

a. [REDACTED]. He managed the CG's calendar, schedule, speeches, correspondence; synchronized activities; and performed other duties, as required.

b. He never saw anything that would suggest more than a professional relationship between MG Grigsby and [REDACTED] to include emails or messages he reviewed for the CG. He noticed that [REDACTED] acted "weird to him" when he walked the CG from event to event. He protected the CG from people coming up to him. She never came to see the CG when he was around. He heard that the CG had mentored a cohort of five officers prior to his arrival, but most of them had left. He did not notice any unusual access that [REDACTED] had to the CG since he had been the XO.

c. Regarding messages on 14 August 2016, [REDACTED] could have messaged him when the command group redeployed from NTC, but he could not recall the specific details of the situation or the conversation. He recalled that [REDACTED] contacted him because she was concerned that MG Grigsby might try to hurt himself. This was the first time [REDACTED] had mentioned to him that MG Grigsby might hurt himself. He contacted the Aide, CSM, and the Chief of Staff. The Aide got back to him and told him

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that the CG was okay. He did not have the messages from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) on his phone anymore because the G-6 had recently cleared all the phones because of a unit spillage issue.

[IO Note: The DAIG confirmed with the Fort Riley G-6 that there was a spillage incident that required clearing messages from the command group phones.]

d. There was a period of time when the CG did not have an official government phone. There was an issue between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) that involved the use of the government phone, but he did not know the details of the issue. He eventually got MG Grigsby a replacement phone.

e. He had heard rumors about a relationship between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) but he dismissed them because no one ever had facts. He ignored them to preserve good order and discipline. He did not believe that anyone tried to cover up MG Grigsby's actions, but thought that no one had any facts. They had just heard rumors regarding the relationship with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

9. Telephone records indicated:

a. MG Grigsby's telephone records, between November 2015 and August 2016, found MG Grigsby made or received 2,457 total calls. Of those calls, 736, or almost 30%, were from or to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) It appeared that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) initiated 98 of those calls. There was no record of any calls from 1 June 2016 until 20 August 2016, the reported period when MG Grigsby did not have a government cell phone.

b. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) phone records indicated 34 calls to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) number. This included 15 calls made during the period that MG Grigsby did not have a government phone.

c. There were 47 calls between MG Grigsby's phone and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) phone during this period.

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10. Text message records indicated the following text volume between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

MONTH	MG Grigsby sent	(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) sent	Extraordinary activity (included in total count)	
November 2015	2	18		
December 2015	4	52	22 - during Christmas	
January 2016	56	148	173 - on Holiday weekend; 103 of these from 0727 - 0802 17 January	13 - on non-holiday weekends 17 - before and after New Year
February 2016	3	53		
March 2016	65	134	24 - on weekends	45 - between 1800, 10 March and 0830 11 March
April 2016	40	76		
May 2016	68	99	65 - on 19 May	20 - on Memorial Day weekend
June - 20 Aug no phone				
August 2016	13	0		
TOTAL	251	580		

[IO Note: Numbers in chart reflect text messages/pictures or videos.]

[IO Note: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Deputy, Systems Readiness-G6, verified that phone call and text logs were not available for the iPad devices used by the 11D. The DAIG could not review MG Grigsby's use of FaceTime video, phone calls, or messages sent outside of the official government phone system.]

11. The DAIG reviewed available email messages sent between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) when at least one party used the official government email system. The DAIG put the emails into four general categories: Professional/mentor/logistics related; forwarded/blind carbon copy (bcc) emails sent to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) personal emails that appeared to be sent for advice, affirmation, or reassurance; and uncategorized. The complete text of selected emails are contained in the exhibits. Extracts of some of the emails are presented below to illustrate the nature of the messages.

[IO Note: The recoverable emails did not include all the messages sent between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) as evidenced by missing forwarded email messages, referenced messages, and incomplete conversations. The DAIG determined, however, that enough of the email record was available to assess the communications between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)]

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a. MG Grigsby's emails indicated that he shared information with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and occasionally other junior officers. He also used email to ask her opinion on logistics matters, or NTC issues because of her past assignment as an observer/controller at NTC. The following emails were categorized under professional/mentor/logistics.

(1) On 13 January 2016, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) emailed MG Grigsby from her personal email account, Subject: "Staff officer." She sent a link to an article in The Military Leader, titled, "7 Ways to fail as a staff officer." She wrote, "I read this article (written by a leader in 2nd brigade) and I thought you might find it interesting." MG Grigsby responded, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) roger all will read and thanks for sending...will provide comments after I read..."

(2) On 6 June 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded comments from MG Joseph Martin, CG, Fort Irwin and NTC, Subject: Devil Brigade's sustainment preparation for NTC, to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) on her personal email account. He wrote, "FYI, lets discuss tomorrow...ok...and thanks..your thoughts...Grigsby." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded in part, "Sir, Great point by MG Martin on task org. Units will understand better if things are more standardized with respect to logistics." The email continues with additional comments regarding MG Martin's comments to MG Grigsby.

(3) On 6 June 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded an email to what appeared to be officers he mentored, Subject: UNC Insights newsletter from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) He wrote, "Team, fyi...think I have sent this to you guys before...hope all is going well...congrats to Joe...now a Major...should we pull him off... Grigsby." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded only to MG Grigsby, "Sir, thanks for sharing. I read that article "When you should say no to your boss." Interesting read indeed, but while I agree with most of it, as a Soldier, I'd say we are less entitled to separate ourselves from work." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) continued the email describing her commitment to the military, her career, and family.

[IO Note: MG Grigsby's email account did not contain responses from any of the other officers this message was sent to.]

(4) On 27 July 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded a message to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Subject: 26 July NTC Mission Command Group OPSUM. MG Grigsby wrote, "What do you think from your experience good or bad. GRIGSBY." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded, "Sir, I would ask a few things- (1) what is the plan for those 6 tanks?... (2) reading between the lines—sounds like the railhead ops didn't go well... (3) do you have time to sit in the logsynch today? (4) how's the LNO package doing integrating into 375th cssb?"

(5) On 27 July 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and email sent to him from BG Frank, Assistant Division Commander, 1ID, Subject: NTC Update. MG Grigsby wrote, "Know your busy, but when you have time let me know what you think...GRIGSBY." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded in part, "Sir, interesting news on the slent.

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Not sure that was reflected on the daily status report...[W]hat's the LNO package relaying with respect to the CSSB?...Where is the aviation unit and the chemical BN during all this? Are they integrated with the bde plan? Make them & the CSSB attend the brigade rehearsals—like you did in the WFX sir. Or this whole thing will be de-synched."

(6) On 28 July 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded a message to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Subject: 27JUL NTC Mission Command Group OPSUM. He wrote, "Thank you...GRIGSBY." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded in part, "Sir, [w]hy can't the bsb get fuel task organized to them for a battle period?...What's going on with the Paladins? The slant should reflect what's happening on the ground. Interesting. You should sit in on that log synchs sir..."

(7) On 29 July 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded an email to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) sent from BG Frank, Subject: NTC Update (28JUL16), with a comment from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) "Sir, [t]his issue is being worked by the entire team and should know something this morning." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) replied, "Sir, ask about retrans—this is not good. JLIST will be fine—just approve the wet weather top/bottom substitute and you won't have the distraction of trying to get more stuff to them."

(8) On 28 July 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded an email from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Commander, Operations Group, NTC, Subject: 16-08 Bronco Notes, and wrote, "let me know what u think...from ur experience...no rush...GRIGSBY." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded, "Common theme sir—communication & PACE plan. Should have been practicing in the RUBA. My guess is that they used texts and NIPR emails during the RSOI & danger focus—this creates bad habits."

(9) On 30 July 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded an email to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Subject: Subject: UNC Insights newsletter from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) MG Grigsby wrote, "Proud of you three... thanks for all you are doing for the team...we need your leadership...please see below, part of your leader dev...I started getting these at one of my General officer courses..let me know what you think." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded to all and provided comments on the newsletter. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) followed up with comments on the newsletter and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) comments. MG Grigsby responded to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) "OK thanks to you both and what u do u have a bright future." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded to MG Grigsby, "Thanks sir. I appreciate your continued mentorship, guidance and confidence. I sure wish I was at NTC right about now....helping"

(10) On 16 August 2016, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) sent MG Grigsby an email, Subject: Initial article feedback. The email had an attachment, 11D Field Grade Paper v4.docx.

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(11) On 17 August 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) an email he received from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Subject: Field Grade Paper. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) wrote in part, "Sir, [d]raft attached for your review. I have included your changes, and highlighted in yellow are areas you have not reviewed...." MG Grigsby's forwarding comment stated, "[a]s discussed I appreciate your comments...apologize again so both of you please look at and let me know what you thinks..and this time I will thank u...thanks again." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded, "Ack and roger sir. I apologize for any disrespect, I promise that was not my intent. Thank you for your leadership and understanding."

(12) On 18 August 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and an unknown recipient an email from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Subject: Draft 365 Assessment. MG Grigsby wrote, "Let me know what u two think and thanks." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) replied, "Hey sir, when do you need feedback? I'm going to look at it tonight." MG Grigsby answered, "Ok that is fine."

b. MG Grigsby's email record indicated he forwarded emails or bcc'd emails to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) that did not appear to be related to mentoring or logistics. The examples below were categorized as forwarded/blind carbon copy (bcc) emails sent to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(1) On 13 January 2016, MG Grigsby bcc'd (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) on an email response sent to the Chief of Staff and other senior leaders in 1ID, regarding an email, Subject: 13 Jan 2016 – Division Highlights.

(2) On 17 August 2016, MG Grigsby bcc'd (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) on an email response to MG Robert White, CG, 1st Armored Division, Subject: Initial Lessons Learned/ ABCT Commander Counseling. MG Grigsby wrote, (b)(6) Roger all, I appreciate you always writing back, honestly u r the only one...please share with us what u learned in the cpx...we could use in Iraq. Thanks brother, I have last pdss in a week will share with u as well."

(3) On 20 August 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded an email from the School of Advance Military Studies, Subject: Visit to SAMS – Read Ahead & Exercise Engagement Officer, to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) with a note, "Thought you might find this interesting. Grigsby." The note addressed MG Grigsby's personal itinerary and provided pre-briefs for MG Grigsby's visit to SAMS.

(4) On 20 August 2016, MG Grigsby bcc'd (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) on an email he sent to senior leaders in 1ID, Subject: QTB additional topics.

(5) On 24 August 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded an email, Subject: CG SVTC w/MG Volesky, 241215Aug 16, to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) with a note, "FYI, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

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c. MG Grigsby sent emails to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) many involving command related issues or actions. Examples of these emails, categorized as informational, or seeking advice, affirmation, or reassurance, are presented below.

(1) On 15 August 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded an email he received from MG Leslie Smith, DTIG, Subject: Inbound BRO (Big Red One) that included a picture of MG Smith and an inbound IG officer for 1ID.

(2) On 20 August 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded an email from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Subject: BN and Company Mission Statements. MG Grigsby wrote, "FYI, for when you are a SPO and then Bn Cdr..proud of you..Grigsby." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded, "It's too long sir. Just my thoughts. I can rewrite."

(3) On 20 August 2016, MG Grigsby bcc'd (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) on an email response to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (British Army), Subject: Visit to 1ID. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) thanked MG Grigsby for the time spent supporting his visit to Ft. Riley. MG Grigsby thanked (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) for the visit and his comments.

(4) In a series of emails beginning on 11 July 2016 through 20 August 2016, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) 1ID, contacted MG Grigsby by email, Subject: Good morning Sir!, concerning a personal issue. MG Grigsby acknowledged the email and forwarded it to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) "FYI, take care.....grigs." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) wrote back, "Sir, I would recommend NOT calling her Gracie. She is an enlisted Soldier and should be addressed as such—(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)" On 13 July 2016, MG Grigsby emailed (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) "Thank you SPC...appreciate the note...you are important you are a Soldier...are you doing okay...now....I will link up with you promise."

(5) On 11 July 2016, MG Grigsby emailed (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) in an off-shoot message to email, Subject: Good morning Sir. MG Grigsby wrote, "(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) I tried to call u. Having some issues I am sorry. Will call later." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded, "Sir, [c]an you call me back? I called your aide—reference EARLY EMBED CONOPS."

(6) An email chain between MG Grigsby, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and BG Malcom Frost, U.S. Army, Chief of Public Affairs (PAO), started on 19 August 2016, Subject: 2 Things, indicated that the 1ID PAO, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (first name not provided), did not have a family care plan and was removed from deployment and the senior service college list. MG Grigsby forwarded the chain to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) on 21 August 2016, and noted, "If interested."

(7) On 25 August 2016, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Commander, 1-7 Field Artillery, 1ID, sent MG Grigsby an email, Subject: 1ID WFX. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) wrote in part, "the 1ID WFX is being taught at the FAPCC [field artillery pre-command course] as the standard.

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Your name is now synonymous with FIRES FORWARD..." MG Grigsby forwarded the message to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) noting, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) really." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded, "Well done sir. You're on fire." MG Grigsby replied, "Thank you have a great nite. Take care."

(8) A 27 August 2016 email exchange between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Subject: Notes from Engagement with the D6/D7 and 299BSB, presented the following:

MG Grigsby: *There is no talent management in the Army, only engaged leader development. It's the Battalion Commander's responsibility to train and develop leaders within his/her unit.*

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) *Interesting point—does this apply to all levels of leadership?*

MG Grigsby: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) *and yes. A4 does not like the work talent management. So we now call it engaged leader dev thoughts.*

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) *: Agree...we can't write people off. It's up to us to develop people. What would have happened to me if someone didn't take the time to develop me?*

MG Grigsby: *Ok, but when fo you cut them off*

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) *I don't know sir...*

MG Grigsby: *For example should I have given that Bn CDR I fired another chance. What do you think, you [r]em[em]ber how hard that was for me. At times u need to shoot ur dog, bit it should be deliberate, I think.*

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) *I agree. I told you that I disagreed when you did it, but you said your hands were tied. Not sure how that works.*

MG Grigsby: *I may have screwed that one up.....should have coached him...but learning point for u did it send a message for toxic leaders to,all. Greater good thoughts.*

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (in part) *Sir, Perhaps it did, I wasn't in the unit so I don't know what was happening...To error is human...we have to recognize and embrace some failures... We can learn from struggle.*

[Emphasis added in bold.]

(9) A screenshot of an email on 27 August 2016, from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) to MG Grigsby, Subject: Rd: Feedback, reflected that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) wrote, "He was humble in providing this reflection to you. Perhaps you were wrong about him. He just needs time to grow and learn. Maybe you should invest in him...I know you saw something in him before he took command. I guess what I am trying to say is don't give up on people so easily..." MG Grigsby responded, "I am with you...just rereading your emails...thanks for the balance...you provide me...Grigsby."

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[IO Note: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) provided the screenshot of this message. The screenshot did not include the entire message, nor was the message in MG Grigsby's government email.]

(10) A 28 August 2016 email chain between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Subject: Comments on AMSP address, indicated that a Canadian Forces officer initially provided comments to MG Grigsby on his presentation at the Advance Military Studies Program. MG Grigsby forwarded the email to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and noted, "Help me with this canadians r wimps." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded in part, "Well, if he doesn't think the US Army is superior then he is delusional. Just thank him and ask him for his version of how ...to discuss a coalition work force. Use him to construct a narrative. He can do that." MG Grigsby responded, "Sent him a note back..let me know...no problem..know you busy...Grigs."

(11) On 31 August 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded an email from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b) Commander, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) The email, Subject: METL Crosswalk, provided senior 1ID leaders a summary of a session (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) conducted with his Battalion Commanders. MG Grigsby forwarded the email with a note, "**Leadership and listens. 1 Block.**" [Emphasis Added]

(12) On 2 September 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) an email from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) a student at the Army Command and General Staff Course, Subject: Feedback (CGSC Visit). (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded, "Worthless feedback. 'I have no sustains.' Who says that?" MG Grigsby responded, "Concur was just sharing for your experience...Grigsby."

(13) On 7 September 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and email from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) a student at the Army Command and General Staff Course, Subject: Commitment and Compliance. MG Grigsby wrote, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) thought you would like, Grigsby." (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded, "Sir, Did he really spend 3 paragraphs quoting the ADRP to you? Wow. This is interesting. I wonder if people are afraid to put things in their own words or terms? He could have told you what it means to him to be committed versus compliant. Disappointing response."

(14) On 14 September 2016, MG Grigsby bcc'd (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) on an email response to BG Michel Russell, J4 Director, U.S. Forces Korea, Subject: RE: update. BG Russell's original message stated in part, "Sir, saw you on the tube over here in Korea during the Army game. You looked ready to suit up and play a down or two..." MG Grigsby responded, (b)(6);(C) roger all great day for the USMA...and the Big Red One...hope all is well...go Transportation..."

(15) An email chain between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) 15 September 2016, was initiated when MG Grigsby forwarded an email regarding MG Hurley, 1st TSC commander, Subject: Re: MG Hurley, 1st TSC CDR, Read-out From Seminar 9// Non-

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Attribution//. MG Grigsby wrote, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) *do not know if he sent this to you directly but thought you would like to have.*" (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded, *"I thought you were friends with Hurley? You couldn't get him to come to Ft Riley whilst he was visiting FLKS?"* MG Grigsby answered, "(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) *All the General's I bring in to assist you young leaders. Guess that is not good enough. I will fix, thanks for the feedback.*"

(16) On 16 September 2016, MG Grigsby forwarded (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) an email from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Deputy Chief of Staff, 11D, Subject: Breaking the Crucible. The email stated in part, *"Sir, I just received this back from Military Review after a heavy editing...My intent is to review this weekend and push back with comments early next week. I will include any comments you wish to make."* MG Grigsby's forwarding note stated, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) *they edited it please let me know what you think."*

d. Uncategorized emails.

(1) On 18 August 2016, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) sent MG Grigsby an email, Subject: Latinos DO age slower than anyone else – and their genes "hold the key." The email included a link to an article with the same topic.

(2) On 21 August 2016, MG Grigsby sent (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) a picture of himself and an infant.

(3) A 23 August 2016 email chain between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Subject: Field Grade Paper for LPD, presented the following exchange:

MG Grigsby: (To (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Division Artillery Commander, 11D) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) *thanks and great session today u r a good man.*" (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) replied, *"Roger Sir, appreciate the wise counsel...great areas to work on. Looking forward to continued teamwork down-range...the WFX brought to life."*

MG Grigsby to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) *I counseled him today, hardest thing I have done....look at his response a true professional, leader. I am humbled. Great learning point here.*

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) *Sir, You're an awesome Commander that people appreciate. Don't ever forget that.*

MG Grigsby: *Last night I did not feel like that...I try to help you always anytime and you punish me, treat me like your enemy.*

[Emphasis Added]

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

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(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(5) On 18 September 2016 (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) sent MG Grigsby an email, Subject: Nap, with nothing in the body of the email.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

MG Grigsby responded on 14 August at 2341 hours:

What is up with u just saw. This.


Below is a synopsis of the remainder of the conversation.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

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13. MG Grigsby emailed (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) on 15 August 2016, at 1810 hours, Subject: I am done. This is too hard. There was no further message in the email.

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14. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) emailed MG Grigsby on 15 August 2016 at 2017 hours, Subject: **Checking in.** (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) wrote, "Sir, Just checking on you. You always say leaders need to be checked as well. You didn't appear to be yourself today. None of my business, but just checking on you. Call if needed." MG Grigsby forwarded this message to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

15. On 20 August 2016, MG Grigsby wrote to someone that appeared to be a personal friend at the email address: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) MG Grigsby wrote in

part, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

16. An email chain between (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and a friend, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) on 5 August 2016 reflected the following conversation:

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

17. On 1 September 2016, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) forwarded emails to MG Grigsby that were sent to her by (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) The contents of the forwarded emails follow.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

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(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

[IO Note: The DAIG reviewed (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) leave record and confirmed she was not on leave during MG Grigsby's TDY to Tampa.]

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) forwarded this email chain to MG Grigsby. He replied, "I deeply apologize for this behavior I am sorry please ignore."

18. On 12 September 2016, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) emailed MG Grigsby, Subject: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) The email stated (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) MG Grigsby contacted (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) on 13 September 2016 and asked if he could share insights on how to better use psyop/non lethal fire capability. In the email MG Grigsby wrote (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responded and provided information. His email noted (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) MG Grigsby forwarded (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) response to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and wrote (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

19. At 4:48 PM, 17 September 2016, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) sent an email to MG Grigsby, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C), and perhaps others, Subject: MG Grigsby STOP (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) WITH (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) The message noted, "bcs get bigger til u do."

[IO Note: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) email address was listed as (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) The DAIG messaged that address and received no response. The DAIG did not determine if anyone beside MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) received the message.]

At 5:48 PM, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) received the same message from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

At 5:50 PM, MG Grigsby responded, "Excuse me...why would someone say this about me."

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At 5:51 PM, MG Grigsby forwarded the message to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

At 5:59 PM, MG Grigsby responded to the original message, "Thank you for looking out for me whoever you are."

At 6:00 PM, MG Grigsby responded to the original message, "What does the bccs below even mean please and thanks."

At 6:07 PM, MG Grigsby forwarded the original message to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and wrote, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) apologize to send this to you...but why would someone send this to me."

At 7:11 PM, MG Grigsby forwarded the message to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

On 18 September 2016, 3:06 PM, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) emailed MG Grigsby and wrote, "Sir, call me."

20. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) elected not to testify or provide a written statement (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

21. MG Grigsby elected not to testify, but agreed to provide a written statement through his attorney after being informed of the unfavorable information the DAIG would present in the ROI. MG Grigsby wrote:

a. I am writing this statement to accept responsibility for my inappropriate behavior and apologize for letting down my wife and family, as well as my former Soldiers and the leaders of the U.S. Army that had put trust in me.

b. I did foster a very expanded professional mentor program that reached down to the lowest levels to get better understanding of what my Soldiers thought at every level... I would specifically meet with CPTs and MAJs to discuss ideas and thoughts and learn from them... Several CPTs that I did talk to by name were (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and a (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) I was searching for ground truth and understanding, as well as identifying key leaders for professional development.

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c. I did make a lot of phone calls and text messages to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) to her personal number/phone. While those phone calls did start off professional in nature, many of them did turn into a personal nature. I would call her all times throughout the day and night.

d. I did forward some command related emails to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) As we continued to talk and text she did become a trusted friend. I would ask for her advice and perspective on different issues that I thought beneficial to receive a different perspective. I would also email her speeches and drafts of articles to get her perspective as she is a very accomplished writer... As the senior member, I take full responsibility for the transition of the relationship from strictly professional to a mixed relationship with a significant personal component.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

f. On or about 18 Aug, I did go over to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) House following my two week trip to the National Training Center. At the time I was collaborating on a senior leadership article with two other individuals. While at NTC I was unable to focus on my part of the piece and now that I had returned, I wanted her assistance in helping to format my section. Since she was helping me in an unofficial capacity during her personal time, I did not want to demand that she come in to the office so I went to where she was located.

g. I did have a white phone for a period of time. I did talk and text on this phone to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) as well as to my wife, my dad, my sister, and a number of friends.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

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would reply back that there was nothing going on and this was a professional relationship.

j. The relationship that I had with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) did start off as a professional relationship as I was trying to gain more knowledge on logistics operations. While "just a captain" she was at the NTC prior to her assignment at Fort Riley and she impressed me as a true subject matter expert in the field having seen many iterations of both techniques that worked and those that failed. As time went on I became all the more impressed with her and I allowed our professional relationship to morph into a personal one over time. She became a confidant and trusted friend.

k. I do apologize for my inappropriate behavior. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Again, let me stress, I individually take full responsibility for my actions. The relationship should have never become personal in nature. By allowing this to happen I have let down the one person who has stood by me from the beginning, my wife, and the one thing that has given me everything, the United States Army. I offer my Family, as well as the Soldiers and civilians of the Army, particularly those who placed their trust in me, my sincere apology.

ANALYSIS / DISCUSSION:

1. AR 600-20 provides the conditions when relationships between Soldiers of different grade are prohibited. The regulation notes that actual and perceived compromises of supervisory authority or the chain of command; actual or perceived partiality; and the improper use of position or grade are violations. The regulation further prohibits relationships if they create an actual or clearly predictable adverse impact on discipline, authority, morale, or the ability of the command to accomplish its mission. The preponderance of evidence indicated that the relationship between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) violated the regulation.

2. The email communications between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) compromised the chain of command both directly and indirectly. MG Grigsby claimed he initially relied on (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) because of her NTC and logistics experience. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) may have possessed unique experiences based on her previous assignments; however, both MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) compromised the chain of command when they routinely bypassed her supervisors and discussed logistics operations directly. Additionally, MG Grigsby compromised the chain of command when he forwarded or blind copied (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) messages sent to him by Army senior leaders, BG Frank, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) subordinate commanders, and NTC staff for her comment or information. Several of

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these emails contained MG Grigsby's thoughts related to actions or assessments of his subordinate leaders, all of whom were superior to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). Sharing these emails violated the confidentiality the email senders would reasonably expect for this type of communication, and provided a junior officer, without a need to know, inappropriate access to the CG's decision making process and personnel assessments.

3. The relationship between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) created both a perception of partiality towards (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and biased actions in favor (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) as evidenced by MG Grigsby's desire to station her at a particular FOB and make her his CAG. Witness testimony was consistent in observing that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) appeared to have special access to the CG. Several witnesses commented that MG Grigsby spent an unusual amount of time talking to or texting (b)(6);(b)(7)(C), a fact supported by the email, phone, and text records. Almost one-third of MG Grigsby's phone calls were to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) far more than to any key staff member. Additionally, MG Grigsby was not impartial when he forwarded and blind copied emails regarding 1ID activities, leader decisions, command briefs, and general officer communications solely to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). The evidence did not support MG Grigsby's assertion that this was part of mentoring junior officers, as other junior officers were rarely included in the correspondence.

3. The evidence indicated that the relationship between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was exploitative, in that they both used the situation to gain an advantage or benefit.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) MG Grigsby used his position when he offered the CAG position to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and asked her if she was interested in the PAO position. These actions arguably led to a personal gain of a friend and confidant for MG Grigsby, and they indicated MG Grigsby's desire to help (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) advance and to keep her close to the command group. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

4. The relationship between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) had an adverse impact on discipline, authority, and the ability of the command to accomplish its mission. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

were distracted from their primary mission of

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preparing the unit to deploy in order to minimize the impact on the unit by what they considered an inappropriate relationship between the CG and a subordinate. The witnesses were consistent in acknowledging rumors of a relationship between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). While a lack of conclusive evidence limited the reporting of the relationship by the staff, MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) relationship influenced staff actions. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) were distracted from their normal duties to ensure MG Grigsby stayed away from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) had to consider the relationship when making FOB assignments, and then justify his decision when challenged by MG Grigsby. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was put in an uncomfortable position of having to provide direct counsel on a sensitive issue to the CG on multiple occasions. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) became frustrated when the CG ignored his counsel and continued to focus attention on (b)(6);(b)(7)(C).

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

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(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

7. As the senior participant in the relationship, MG Grigsby failed to end or limit his relationship with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) even though he knew it was wrong. Although MG Grigsby accepted responsibility for the inappropriate relationship, he only did so after he was informed of an official investigation into his alleged misconduct. While it was likely that the relationship started as a professional relationship, MG Grigsby ignored several warnings and allowed the relationship to become personal, stating that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was a confidant and trusted friend." MG Grigsby knew this type of relationship was prohibited by regulation. (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was not in an official position that warranted her access to much of the information MG Grigsby shared with her, but he chose to share it. While MG Grigsby could have faced personal challenges during this period, he demonstrated poor judgement when he chose (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) a junior staff officer, as his confidant.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

9. The preponderance of credible evidence indicated that MG Grigsby's relationship with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was inappropriate and had an adverse impact on authority, morale, and ability of the 11D to perform its mission. MG Grigsby's statement acknowledged he "allowed [our] professional relationship to morph into a personal one over time." While he acknowledged that he knew the relationship was wrong, he did not indicate any desire to end the relationship or cite any actions he took to end the relationship.

10. Although MG Grigsby was in the best position to limit his relationship with (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) she also had a responsibility to keep the relationship professional. The emails obtained during the investigation, as well as the number of text messages she sent MG Grigsby (580 to his 251), showed that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) was not only willing to participate in a personal relationship with MG Grigsby, but helped to create that relationship. Her attempt to influence her FOB assignment was an attempt to use this

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relationship to her advantage. As such, it is appropriate to also hold (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) responsible for the inappropriate relationship with MG Grigsby.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The allegation that MG Grigsby engaged in an inappropriate relationship was substantiated.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

OTHER MATTERS:

1. The DAIG reviewed the evidence to evaluate the possibility of a sexual relationship between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) use of the term "temptation", the FaceTime call on 14 August 2016, and MG Grigsby's visit to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) house are all questionable events. The DAIG found that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and several witnesses speculated that MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) had a sexual relationship; however, DAIG did not find conclusive evidence to support or disprove the speculation. MG Grigsby did not describe the nature of the relationship in his statement and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) declined to testify. While the circumstances described in this investigation could raise suspicion, especially MG Grigsby's visit to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) house, the evidence to establish a sexual relationship was inconclusive.

2. As mentioned in the report, DAIG limited the number of witnesses interviewed to limit the impact on the 11D as it prepared to deploy. The witnesses interviewed were professional in their participation in the investigation. It was evident that witnesses struggled with a desire to help MG Grigsby, but they understood that participation in the investigation was in the best interest of the Army.

3. The DAIG noted that MG Grigsby claimed in an email exchange involving his marital issues in August 2016, that he had informed the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) "what is going on." The DAIG does not have the authority to inquire into an officer in the rank of GENERAL, so no further action is warranted by DAIG.

4. In a separate email that (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) on 1 September 2016, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) alleged that she had inform the spouse of MG Grigsby's "boss" about (b)(6);(b)(7)(C). The DAIG determined that the spouse of the "boss" was a civilian and would not be required to testify. As neither MG Grigsby nor (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) testified, and the email message did not provide further details regarding the alleged conversation, the DAIG determined there was insufficient information to warrant discussion of this matter with MG Grigsby's "boss."

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
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RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. This report be approved and the case closed.
2. Refer this report to the Judge Advocate General for appropriate action.
3. Take no action on Other Matters #1, #2, #3 and #4.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Investigator



DAVID E. QUANTOCK
Lieutenant General, USA
The Inspector General

<i>for</i>	COORDINATION:	
	Chief, Branch	Initials (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
	Chief, IN Division	Initials (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
	IG Legal	Initials (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
	DTIG	Initials (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Date: 2 Dec 16
 Date: 5 Dec 16
 Date: 13 Dec 16
 Date: 13 Dec 16

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LIST OF EXHIBITS**EXHIBIT ITEM**

- A Authority/Complaint**
- A-1: Complaints
- A-2: Directive
- A-3: Legal Reviews
- B Standard: AR 600-20 excerpts**
- C Documents**
- C-1: DAIG ROI 16-00033 (base report) and closure letter
- C-2: Screenshot of message, dated 27 July 2016
- C-3: Twitter posts by (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
- C-4: Screenshot of FaceTime record while TDY to West Point
- C-5: Images extracted from video – (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) license plate and truck in garage
- C-6: Professional/mentor/logistics related emails
- C-7: Forwarded/blind carbon copy (bcc) emails
- C-8: Personal emails
- C-9: Uncategorized emails
- C-10: Email chain between MG Grigsby and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C), 14/15 August 2016, and MG Grigsby's DoD Mobility End User License Agreement
- C-11: MG Grigsby email to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) 15 August 2016
- C-12: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) email to MG Grigsby, 15 August 2016
- C-13: Email from (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) to MG Grigsby, 20 August 2016
- C-14: Email between (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) 5 August 2016
- C-15: Email between (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) 1 September 2016
- C-16: Emails regarding (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) PSYOPS, 12 September 2016
- C-17: Email messages related to (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) email, Subject: MG Grigsby STOP HAVING AN AFFAIR WITH (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) 17 September 2016
- C-18: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
- C-19: MG Grigsby's telephone usage records
- C-20: Text message logs
- D Subject Statement: MG Grigsby statement**

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E

Testimony

- E-1: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
- E-2:
- E-3:
- E-4:
- E-5:

F

Notifications

- F-1: GEN Abrams
- F-2: LTG MacFarland
- F-3: MG Grigsby
- F-4: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)