



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
1700 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1700**

FEB 15 2011

**US ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL AGENCY
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(Case 10-028)**

NAME/POSITION: Brigadier General (BG) Scott F. Donahue, Commanding General (CG), US Army Engineer Division, South Pacific, US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), San Francisco, California

SUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATION AND CONCLUSION: BG Donahue failed to foster a healthy command (CMD) climate. The preponderance of evidence established that the South Pacific Division (SPD) experienced a negative CMD climate under BG Donahue's leadership. An SPD Headquarters CMD climate survey completed eight months into BG Donahue's CMD and witness testimony indicated BG Donahue created a tense working environment and that his executive staff experienced negative treatment from BG Donahue that they considered and others viewed as abusive. Evidence from both the CMD climate survey and the DAIG interviews documented this feedback for a period covering BG Donahue's first year in CMD of the SPD from July 2009 to October 2010. Eighteen witnesses included the executive staff, SPD senior leadership and USACE senior leadership. All 18 felt the CMD climate was negative. BG Donahue's treatment of subordinates included his expressing anger and moodiness, bringing people to tears, abusing subordinates' time through long meetings and lecturing, raising his voice or yelling, dominating discussions, exhibiting paranoia, and creating a tense working environment. The majority of these witnesses testified they would not work for BG Donahue if asked, however, some said they would. Four additional witnesses testified that BG Donahue was a positive leader who treated them with dignity and respect. However, three of the four witnesses did not observe or were not in a position to observe the negative treatment described by the 18 other witnesses. BG Donahue provided no credible evidence to support his assertion that one of his executive staff members "orchestrated" efforts of the executive staff to undermine his authority. In mitigation, the evidence indicated although BG Donahue took steps to improve the CMD climate, he did not improve his negative treatment of subordinates or how others viewed his negative treatment of subordinates. Additionally, evidence indicated prior to BG Donahue taking CMD, the SPD was the worst of nine Divisions in the USACE and had experienced significant leadership turbulence. Together with the unique culture of San Francisco and the civilian mindset of the SPD, BG Donahue recognized that the SPD was dysfunctional and ineffective. His intent was to teach and train, raise standards, improve operating efficiency, and hold people accountable through impassioned servant leadership. The evidence indicated, however, BG Donahue's direct leadership style was not well received by the SPD nor did he effectively adjust his style to the SPD.

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BACKGROUND:

1. On 16 June 2010, the Department of the Army Inspector General Agency (DAIG) received an anonymous complaint through the CG, USACE. The complaint alleged BG Donahue verbally abused, intimidated, and humiliated his civilian staff, and exhibited unprofessionalism in his treatment of others. The complaint also alleged that he wasted government resources and misused government property.

2. A preliminary inquiry, DIG 10-00083, approved 24 September 2010, determined that the allegation that BG Donahue failed to treat subordinates with dignity and respect required further investigation. (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

3. On 24 September 2010, the Vice Chief of Staff, Army directed an investigation by the DAIG.

SYNOPSIS:

1. Army Regulation (AR) 600-100, Army Leadership, dated 8 March 2007, paragraph 2-1l states that leaders will foster a healthy command (CMD) climate. Paragraph 2-1k, states that leaders will treat subordinates with dignity, respect, fairness, and consistency.

2. BG Donahue was notified for CMD of the SPD in March 2009. He redeployed in April 2009, after serving 15 months as the XVIII Airborne Corps Engineer in Iraq, and assumed CMD on 21 July 2009 as a Colonel (COL). BG Donahue was confirmed by the Senate on 25 September 2009 and frocked on 9 April 2010. His appointment as a BG was effective 2 May 2010. The previous CG, BG John McMahon, left the SPD in January 2009 and deployed to Afghanistan. COL (b)(7)(C) the Deputy Commander, SPD, became the Commander in January 2009 and commanded the SPD for six months before BG Donahue took CMD. The SPD HQ was located on the 20th floor of the Bank of America building in the city of San Francisco. There were dynamics peculiar to the SPD unlike the other eight Divisions in the USACE. Seventy-five percent of the civilian employees belonged to Local 49 Union. The majority of the SPD HQ 85 employees were civilian. Because of the high cost of living, oftentimes employees opted to move to the SPD to earn their "high three" base salary for retirement.

3. At the direction of the CG, USACE, the IG, USACE completed a CMD climate survey of the SPD HQ. The SPD CMD climate survey, dated 24 March 2010, reflected 53 responses from subordinates out of 85 total employees. Twenty pages of the SPD survey included "Employee Comments." The "Employee Comments" reflected that BG Donahue: berated/belittled his staff to include their work products, he focused on power point slides and thus focused on format vice substance or producing work/getting

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things done, there was a decline in morale and staff was stressed, he was unapproachable and intimidating (no open door policy), he focused on himself, family, and his faith vice others, he had no respect for employees' time due to multiple/long meetings, he was angry, exhibited a bitter attitude, and did not control his temper.

4. Witness testimony from 18 individuals indicated the SPD executive staff experienced negative treatment from BG Donahue that they considered and others viewed as abusive. These 18 witnesses included the executive staff, SPD senior leadership and USACE senior leadership. BG Donahue's treatment of subordinates included BG Donahue expressing anger and moodiness, bringing people to tears, abusing subordinates' time through long meetings and lecturing, raising his voice or yelling, dominating discussion, exhibiting paranoia, and creating a tense working environment. All 18 felt the CMD climate was negative. The majority of these witnesses testified they would not work for BG Donahue if asked. Four additional witnesses testified that BG Donahue was a positive leader who treated them with dignity and respect. However, three of the four witnesses did not observe or were not in a position to observe the negative treatment described by the 18 other witnesses.

a. The majority of the executive staff testified to observing or receiving harsh treatment from BG Donahue, which included (b)(7)(C) being berated and (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) being brought to tears. (b)(7)(C) however, testified that she cried for personal reasons, not because she was berated by BG Donahue. Other credible witnesses including the Deputy, COL (b)(7)(C) the (b)(7) SES Directors, and other senior leaders felt or knew these instances of negative treatment were credible. Ten subordinates and senior leaders felt so strongly, they testified they would not work for BG Donahue again. There was consistent testimony about BG Donahue's anger or expressions of anger and his abuse of subordinates' time by lecturing for hours. (b)(7) of four District CDRs felt BG Donahue did not treat subordinates well and that the reports they received about his negative treatment of people were credible.

b. A sampling of comments included:

- "he was especially tough on (b)(7)(C) and she was having difficulty sleeping, and she was really upsetshe was on the verge of tears all the time"
- "I was very glad to leave SPD....I definitely took the assignment in Iraq to get out of SPD...my blood pressure was high...it was just miserable for me...it was really just horrible"
- "has meetings to express anger for one to four hours and the Staff was wore down mentally, they come out shaking, covering their face, will go home sick or almost brought to tears"
- "we're just kind of always walking on egg-shells....no I wouldn't say its physically as much as emotionally and psychologically intimidating"
- he has a "very volatile temper, almost daily"

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-BG Donahue "certainly is not concerned about anybody's time but his own. His own time is the most valuable...he has no concern for late meetings, meetings running over, civilian environment time"

-"he really doesn't have a sense of time. Every meeting is late...I do believe that he in his mind...he thinks he is teaching and he's kind of ranting...he thinks he is coaching people...and he is going off on them"

-"he pretty much raises his voice, stands up sometimes and berates individuals"

-"he thinks....there are alliances against him...all the way up the chain...to HQ"

-"there are no secret parties against him, but he is constantly thinking everybody...is out to see him fail"

-"my impression....he was very hard on people...and very short on patience"

-"I think he was very controlling, micromanaging....very directive. He certainly lacked the depth to do so. He didn't have the experience in our business....I think he led from fear almost."

-"it's the demeanor...tone...persistence...the positional power that would lead the recipient to feel...under pressure...to feel unreasonable demands"

-"I've seen them after these so-called incidents and they have been visibly shaken...under a great stress"

[Investigating Officer note: Detailed witness comments are included at Exhibit A2.]

5. Lieutenant General Robert Van Antwerp, CG, USACE, testified that the SPD ranked ninth of nine Divisions as an overall assessment of performance "at this point in time" in October 2010. He attributed that to the leadership turbulence prior to BG Donahue, the problem with BG Donahue not having experience in USACE or civilian organizations, and the culture of the SPD.

6. BG Donahue testified:

a. Before assuming CMD, he assessed the SPD and concluded that the SPD was the last DIV of nine; "the worst team, not the first team." There were no standards, no SOPs, no branding, no unity, no harmony, no common regional picture, and no sense of pride in the organization. It was dysfunctional to have the CDR, COL [REDACTED] as a former Deputy, to become his Deputy in the same CMD. In speaking to senior leaders at USACE, the SPD was the "last DIV on anybody's radar screen for just about everything." Feedback from all four District CDRs was that the SPD HQ was not responsive, not helpful and too involved in their business. He felt the civilians in the SPD concluded before he arrived that he would not "get it" and they should "keep him on the road and in the dark." He saw "a lot of holes" and the organizational efficiency and effectiveness deteriorated significantly. LTG Van Antwerp asked him to take CMD in June 2009, two months sooner than BG Donahue wanted, given the recovery from a 15-month deployment to Iraq ending in April 2009. He believed if things were going smoothly, why would the COE want him to take CMD so soon?

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b. Regarding the CMD climate survey, he felt he was misunderstood and some (employees) were potentially offended. "I was devastated, very hurtful." He took immediate action to meet with SPD leadership and employees to provide feedback and solicit discussion to resolve issues. He never blamed anybody for the results of the survey; rather, he took responsibility for it. He never alleged organizational deficiency was attributed to COL (b)(7)(C). He invested a lot of time and effort to fix the root of the problem. He published an open door policy, established an Employee Portal system to receive employee feedback, initiated DIV Chief Luncheons, and laid out a path to improve the SPDs standing.

c. He testified that he did not get angry, rather "I'm intense because I'm passionate." He never berated anybody.

d. Regarding incidents involving subordinates who were brought to tears:

(1) BG Donahue asserted that the claim he brought (b)(7)(C) to tears over the Strategic Initiatives Group (SIG) was "absolutely false." He testified that (b)(7)(C) She was fine with the SIG duty.

(2) The claim that he brought (b)(7)(C) to tears for leaving the SPD was a "misrepresentation of attitudes and emotions." (b)(7)(C) became teary-eyed when she told him she was not leaving because of him and he gave her a hug.

(3) The claim that he brought (b)(7)(C) to tears was according to (b)(7)(C) "absolutely false." (b)(7)(C) was very emotional and he saw her cry a number of times.

(4) The claim that he brought (b)(7)(C) to tears and berated him was "completely non-factual." When he asked (b)(7)(C) about his decline in performance, (b)(7)(C) They became emotional together and he hugged (b)(7)(C)

e. He never pointed fingers at people; never put his finger in anyone's chest, or cocked his fist at anyone. He was unaware of any time he grabbed his rank insignia to make a point that he was a COL or GO. His teaching and training was misinterpreted as some sort of "tantrum." He believed "accountability" was mistaken for "aggressiveness."

f. He denied keeping subordinates over their scheduled work hours or holding people for three to five hours. His Deputy and CofS controlled the schedule. "I don't have that kind of time in the day." He denied directing people to spend hours making slides.

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g. He testified that in September 2009, he intervened when (b)(7)(C) reprimanded LTC (b)(7)(C) in a decision briefing. He did not yell and scream. (b)(7)(C) later came back and apologized to him. Mr. Andy Constantaras relayed the incident back to MG Meredith Temple. In April 2010, Mr. Constantaras sent an e-mail to (b)(7)(C) reflecting information that misrepresented what MG Temple and he discussed regarding morale in the SPD and that Mr. Constantaras would be the one to get him (BG Donahue) focused and "get it right." He (BG Donahue) felt "this almost looked like a coup attempt." MG Temple reprimanded Mr. Constantaras. He told Mr. Constantaras he was disloyal and Mr. Constantaras "apologized profusely."

h. He testified that after moving LTC (b)(7)(C) up to be his Deputy and getting LTC (b)(7)(C) agreement to stay on active duty until December 2010, LTC (b)(7)(C) accepted a job offer that meant he had to leave in August 2010. He (BG Donahue) told LTC (b)(7)(C) it "approached an integrity issue" after LTC (b)(7)(C) said he misunderstood his commitment.

i. Finally he felt LTC (b)(7)(C) orchestrated the efforts by other subordinates like (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) to undermine his CMD authority. He believed there was "motive and opportunity" for LTC (b)(7)(C) and COL (b)(7)(C) to facilitate those efforts, to keep him out of the loop, to take the SPD in a different direction than his, and finally to "derail" him.

7. The preponderance of evidence established that the SPD experienced a negative CMD climate under BG Donahue's leadership. An SPD HQ CMD climate survey completed eight months into BG Donahue's CMD and witness testimony indicated BG Donahue created a tense working environment and that his executive staff experienced negative treatment from BG Donahue that they considered and others viewed as abusive. Evidence from both the CMD climate survey and the DAIG interviews documented this feedback for a period covering BG Donahue's first year in CMD of the SPD from July 2009 to October 2010. Eighteen witnesses included the executive staff, SPD senior leadership and USACE senior leadership. All 18 felt the CMD climate was negative. BG Donahue's treatment of subordinates included BG Donahue expressing anger and moodiness, bringing people to tears, abusing subordinates time through long meetings and lecturing, raising his voice or yelling, dominating discussions, exhibiting paranoia, and creating a tense working environment. The majority of these witnesses testified they would not work for BG Donahue if asked. Four additional witnesses testified that BG Donahue was a positive leader who treated them with dignity and respect. Although three of the four witnesses did not observe or were not in a position to observe the negative treatment described by the 18 other witnesses. Although BG Donahue's versions of incidences of people who were brought to tears differed from witnesses, the fact remains that two subordinates were brought to tears when interacting with BG Donahue. Evidence also indicated that one of the

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descriptions of an incident involving BG Donahue was reported through hearsay and was inaccurate. The incident involving (b)(7)(C) was also an example of an inaccurate report of harsh treatment by BG Donahue. Regardless, there were substantial incidents/complaints exchanged between numerous credible witnesses who reported actual and perceived negative treatment by BG Donahue. BG Donahue provided no credible evidence to support his assertion that LTC (b)(7)(C) "orchestrated" efforts of the executive staff to undermine his authority. In mitigation, the evidence indicated although BG Donahue took steps to improve the CMD climate, he did not improve his negative treatment of subordinates or how others viewed his negative treatment of subordinates. Additionally, the evidence indicated prior to BG Donahue taking CMD, the SPD was the worst of nine Divisions in the USACE and had experienced significant leadership turbulence. Together with the unique culture of San Francisco and the civilian mindset of the SPD, BG Donahue recognized that the SPD was dysfunctional and ineffective. His intent was to teach and train, raise standards, improve operating efficiency, and hold people accountable through impassioned servant leadership. The evidence indicated, however, BG Donahue's directed leadership style was not well received by the SPD nor did he effectively adjust his style to the SPD.

8. The preponderance of evidence established that BG Donahue failed to foster a healthy CMD climate.


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OTHER MATTERS: An anonymous complaint, dated 4 June 2010, alleged that pending an investigation of BG Donahue, the complainant would withhold sending 18 written statements of inappropriate actions, Anti-deficiency Act violations, and project splitting to the General Accounting Office, DAIG, Members of Congress, and the media on 30 July 2010. There was no credible evidence obtained in the PI or investigation that revealed the source of the complaint, the content of the alleged 18 statements, or any specific impropriety related to BG Donahue.

RECOMMENDATIONS:


1. This report be approved and the case closed.
2. Refer this report to the Office of The Judge Advocate General.
3. Refer Other Matters to the IG, USACE.

(b)(7)(C)




COL, IG
Investigator

CONCUR:


WILLIAM H. MCCOY
Major General, U.S. Army
Acting The Inspector General


Encls

(b)(7)(C)



Investigator

APPROVED:


PETER W. CHIARELLI
General, U.S. Army
Vice Chief of Staff

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ROI Abbreviations and Acronyms

The following abbreviations and/or acronyms appeared in this report:

AR	Army Regulation
BG	Brigadier General
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CG	Commanding General
CMD	Command
COL	Colonel
CSO	Center for Special Operations
DA	Department of the Army
DAIG	Department of the Army Inspector General Agency
E-mail	Electronic mail
ERC	Employee Relations Committee
GO	General Officer
HQ	Headquarters
IG	Inspector General
IO	Investigating Officer
LTG	Lieutenant General
MG	Major General
ROI	Report of Investigation
SES	Senior Executive Service
SOP	Standing Operating Procedures
SPD	San Francisco District
US	United States
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
XO	Executive Officer

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ROI Personnel Listing

Altendorf, Christine, Dr., SES, Director of Programs, SPD

(b)(7)(C) Program Manager, (b)(7)(C) SPD

(b)(7)(C) COL (Ret), CDR, (b)(7)(C) SPD

Constantaras, Andrew, Mr., SES, Director Regional Business Directorate, SPD

(b)(7)(C) COL, Deputy CDR, SPD

Donahue, Scott, F., BG, CG, SPD

(b)(7)(C) LTC, CDR, (b)(7)(C) SPD

(b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) SPD

(b)(7)(C) LTC, (b)(7)(C) CDR, SPD

(b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) SPD

(b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) SPD

(b)(7)(C) COL, CDR, (b)(7)(C) SPD

(b)(7)(C) Program Manager, (b)(7)(C) SPD

(b)(7)(C) Program Manager, (b)(7)(C) SPD

(b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) SPD

Riley, Don, MG (Ret), former DCG, USACE

(b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) SPD

(b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) SPD

(b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) SPD

(b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) SPD

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Temple, Meredith, MG, DCG, USACE

Van Antwerp, Robert, Jr., LTG, CG, USACE

(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

SPD

LIST OF EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT ITEM

A Directive and Legal Reviews

- A-1 Directive and Legal Reviews
- A-2 Witness Comments

B Documents

- B-1 Evidence Matrix
- B-2 Power Point Briefing: Servant Leadership, dated 12 August 2010
- B-3 DIG 10-00083, approved 24 September 2010

C Testimony

- | | | |
|------|---------------------|-----------|
| C-1 | COL (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: NO |
| C-2 | LTC (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: NO |
| C-3 | Ms. (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: NO |
| C-4 | Ms. (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: NO |
| C-5 | Ms. (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: YES |
| C-6 | Mr. (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: NO |
| C-7 | Ms. (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: NO |
| C-8 | Mr. (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: YES |
| C-9 | Mr. (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: NO |
| C-10 | Mr. (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: NO |
| C-11 | (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: YES |
| C-12 | COL (Ret) (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: YES |
| C-13 | COL (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: YES |
| C-14 | Mr. Constantaras | FOIA: NO |
| C-15 | Dr. Altendorf | FOIA: NO |
| C-16 | (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: YES |
| C-17 | LTC (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: NO |
| C-18 | (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: YES |
| C-19 | (b)(7)(C) | FOIA: YES |
| C-20 | MG (Ret) Riley | FOIA: NO |
| C-21 | MG Temple | FOIA: YES |
| C-22 | LTG Van Antwerp | FOIA: NO |
| C-23 | BG Donahue | FOIA: NO |

D Notifications

- D-1 LTG Van Antwerp
- D-2 BG Donahue

BG DONAHUE'S REBUTTAL



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND
4710 KNOX STREET
FORT BRAGG, NC 28310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

AFRC-OP

12 October 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR The Inspector General (ATTN: LTG Peter M. Vangiel), Office of the Secretary of the Army, 1700 Army Pentagon, Room 3E588, Washington, DC 20310-1700

SUBJECT: Request for Re-investigation -- DAIG Report of Investigation (ROI) 10-028

1. **Summary.** On 17 September, 2012 I formally requested Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) support in directing a re-investigation of the substantiated allegation I failed to foster a healthy command climate in the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) South Pacific Division (SPD) from July 2009 to January 2011. On 5 October, 2012 I discussed this request via phone with The Inspector General (TIG), and was directed to submit my appeal to Deputy The Inspector General (MG Ross E. Ridge). Following a comprehensive review by me and my attorney of the information provided by the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) pursuant to my FOIA request (case file Report of Investigation [ROI] 10-028) (~~Enclosure~~ (Enc.) 1), including my seven hours of personal testimony provided on 2 October, 2010 (Enc. 2) coupled with the preponderance of voluntary survey feedback recently received from civilian and military professionals who served under my command (Enc. 3) conclude: (1) a select group of senior civilians and at least two field grade officers in my headquarters, and one subordinate commander, regularly (unbeknownst to me) undermined my authority by being openly disrespectful and encouraging resistance to my directives and efforts to raise the standards of performance (a resistance so overbearing they actively sought to permanently curtail my military career); and (2) the synopsis of the DAIG findings is incomplete and woefully insufficient in that it misstates the evidence in the case in some significant aspects.

2. **Background.**

a. Following a fifteen month tour in Iraq as Director, Multi-National Corps-Iraq C7, I commanded the USACE South Pacific Division, headquartered in San Francisco, California from 21 July, 2009 to 7 January, 2011. Prior to and upon assuming command I conducted a comprehensive 90-day strategic command assessment of the Division through pre-command course seminar and senior executive office calls at USACE Headquarters, pre-change of command surveys with incumbent District commanders, and post-change of command District visits and town hall meetings. Characterized by one employee in confidence as a "mosaic where the pieces don't quite fit," and by another as a headquarters comprised of known obstructionists with "line of sight loyalty," it was readily apparent the Division, and more alarmingly the Division headquarters, had a less than favorable reputation; lacked regional identity; and fostered an indifferent command climate replete with mediocre program management, dysfunctional operating procedures, imprecise executive administration, and dubious professional behavior by civilian executives and senior officers. Further, the Division abandoned its core Implementation Plan (IPLAN) in support of the new USACE Campaign Plan in contravention of Commanding General (CG), USACE guidance; devalued employee and family readiness; and experienced an abnormally high turnover of senior leadership (I was the third Division commander in less than a year and teamed with four different deputies in eighteen months; the current commander is the fifth in a two-year span from 2009-2011).

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b. In January 2010, six months into my command tenure and in compliance with a CG, USACE directive to all nine Division Commanders, I requested the USACE Inspector General administer a Command Climate Survey (CCS) of the SPD headquarters. The CSS was advertised for several weeks, but an insufficient number of employees responded to validate the results. I subsequently approved a re-advertisement of the survey and requested my deputy to encourage employees to participate; approximately 63% responded to 40 favorably worded questions in seven key survey areas. The results indicated we generally tracked the USACE average in 32 areas including team building events, awards/employee recognition, and town hall forums; we were above the USACE average in one area (quality of life programs); and we were below the USACE average in seven areas including workloads, hiring practices, performance appraisals, organizational/cultural barriers, time management, promotion/performance appraisals, employee feedback system, and access to the commander.

c. Upon taking command and in response to these assessments, employee feedback, and my own personal observations, I implemented and sustained a vast array of comprehensive processes, programs, and command information platforms to strengthen human capital, employee relations, and family readiness; to promote a common regional picture; to establish enduring standards of excellence; to infuse an enriched culture of discipline and innovation; to enhance equal employment opportunity and civil rights; to recognize employee achievement; to maximize web/social networking forums; to rebuild a premier IPLAN to meet the Commanding General's intent; to optimize program execution; to grow resilient servant leaders of character; and to build a winning team. Moreover, I conducted the first ever headquarters off-site and an unprecedented two Division senior leader conferences in less than a year; created a relevant weekly Regional Update Assessment (RUA); filmed two command videos with eight different subordinate commanders; expanded my open door policy; launched a first-ever web-based non-attribution employee feedback portal; published a monthly newsletter; and hosted weekly headquarters luncheons with senior leaders, and nearly a dozen dinners/enriching team building events at my quarters at my own expense.

3. Assessment of Adverse Information (Synopsis of DAIG ROI 10-028).

a. The DAIG investigation as it stands is fundamentally unfair, misstates the evidence, is incomplete, and fails to critically weight the information provided. In preparing an appeal, by and through my attorney, I was able to secure fourteen (14) additional statements from individuals very close to my command and serving in an array of positions to witness and corroborate my impressions (Enc. 3). The additional evidence, coupled with portions of the DAIG investigation I was able to procure pursuant to a FOIA request, revealed: the DAIG investigation is substandard and is not an accurate reflection of the available evidence or the command climate that existed during my tenure; and the conclusions drawn by the investigators (IO) lack critical analysis and fail to consider bias. In short, this investigation does me and my family a profound disservice.

b. Considering the basis of knowledge of the sources who provided information to the DAIG, and the reliability of that information regarding the perceived command climate, my temperament, my leadership style, and the civilian culture in the SPD headquarters, I contend the IO gave the greater weight of the evidence to statements from individuals who were widely reported by others to be resistant to military leadership or who only gained the information through biased sources, while the statements from individuals not only in a position to witness my command leadership style first hand, but to also observe the overall command climate were largely discounted.

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c. The recent evidence provided to me indicates the negative quotes cited in the DAIG synopsis come from the same GS-15 and SES employees that I and many others described as being resistant to change and responsible for the dysfunctional environment that existed when I arrived at SPD. There is also an attitude in many of the statements and in the DAIG IO's Executive Summary and findings, that I should have changed my leadership style to a "civilian" way of doing business. I believe the civilian leadership expected their military commanders to abandon their disciplinary authority and lower their performance standards. This, however, was not what was needed to move the organization forward. I also do not believe the principles of a healthy command climate change whether your organization is predominantly military or civilian. The following excerpts from the DAIG investigation speak to the expectation that the civilian work force in this organization had come to benefit from, and the reason for their consistently poor track record:

"He did not have a civilian leadership style. Civilians are more 8 to 5 with weekends." (Enc. 1, C-8, pg. 4).

"We are primarily a civilian organization. So, we don't exactly follow the big Army regimen...not used to that kind of rigor." (Enc. 1, C-11, pg. 3).

"The command climate was difficult. He was more of a muddy boots kind of commander as opposed to business environment." (Enc. 1, C-13, pg. 2).

"The environment in the organization was very dysfunctional. There is a history. Commanders are not supported by the senior staff, GS-15 and above. This has been going on for awhile and with previous commanders. It's a tradition...military commanders are held in contempt." (Enc. 1, C-16, pg. 5).

"People come here to mark their time to get the high three...nobody has loyalty...no cohesiveness. (Enc. 1, C-16, pg. 6).

"The senior civilians, 15s and above, are pretty much set on where they want to go and how they want to do business...my sensing is that they are resistant to military control and operational direction." (Enc. 1, C-19, pg. 3).

"I encouraged him to consider...adaptive leadership in light of the fact that the makeup of the organization that he was about to go into...was primarily a civilian organization." (Enc. 1, C-21, pg. 5).

In contrast to reports of my toxic temperament, statements from individuals close to the situation describe me as a firm, tough and demanding leader, but one who was always respectful, caring and fair. I believe adherence to military standards in a military organization is not open to debate, but unfortunately this was consistently thought of in SPD as an optional requirement, hence the friction that occurred. Despite this, I never berated, threatened or humiliated anyone, nor would I as this is not in any way my personal makeup or my leadership style. The following are excerpts from the DAIG investigation that speak to command climate and my personal demeanor:

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Concerning command climate

"He treated people well, very family-oriented...morale was good." (Enc. 1, C-5, pg. 4).

"It was fine. I communicated with him frequently...our relationship was very good." (Enc. 1, C-12, pg. 2).

"It was positive. BG Donahue has brought some discipline." (Enc. 1, C-18, pg. 2).

"I think the command climate is very good, particularly at the lower levels, GS-14 and below." (Enc. 1, C-19, pg. 3).

Concerning temperament

"He's firm and fair... no profanity, threats or reprisal against anyone." (Enc. 1, C-5, pgs 5-6).

"Never witnessed berating or rage/temper...no improper actions." (Enc. 1, C-8, pg. 11, 14).

"He did treat everyone with dignity and respect...he was hard on people, but not demeaning...it never got personal or disrespectful." (Enc. 1, C-12, pg. 6, 8).

"He was an excellent commander...great job. He's firm and respectful...he does not berate...I had good interaction with him." (Enc. 1, C-16, pgs. 3, 5, 8).

"He is very conscientious, very passionate...very concerned for the employees. He's very grateful to subordinates, very inquisitive. He does not yell and scream...not his method. He has been upset, but nothing unusual for commanders." (Enc. 1, C-18, pgs. 2, 4, 6).

"If I came to him with a problem, he was fine with that. I had his full support." (Enc. 1, C-12, pg. 9-10).

Concerning leadership style

"He is unambiguous...open to consensus building. His leadership style is right on the money." (Enc. 1, C-19, pg. 4).

"His main focus is to try and get the mission done with the resources he has available." (Enc. 1, C-21, pg. 4).

Despite these statements, the IO still found I had failed to foster a healthy command climate. According to the IO Executive Summary, only 4 witnesses made positive statements concerning treatment and climate, however, these excerpts were taken from all 7 of the statements I was provided pursuant to the FOIA request. The initial complaint alleged I verbally abused, intimidated, and humiliated my civilian staff and exhibited unprofessionalism in my treatment of others. Yet, the sampling of comments on page 3 of the Executive Summary does not cite a single specific incident substantiated by a first-hand account; only opinions or second-hand reports, I suspect coming from the same 3 or 4 people. This is not credible evidence and certainly does not amount to a preponderance of the evidence. When I was interviewed by the

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IO, I was not asked to provide the names of other witnesses who could corroborate my version of events and neither were many of the witnesses whose statements were complimentary of me. I volunteered the names of people that could corroborate my version of events, such as my Aide de Camp, (b)(6) & (b)(7)(C) but the IO did not contact those people to my knowledge.

d. The conclusions reached by the DAIG IO are not substantiated by the evidence. The IO indicates I brought people to tears, however, the one specific instance cited by witnesses is denied by the employee herself. (Enc. 1, C-5, pg. 8-9). The IO found that I held people in long meetings and abused their time, but the witnesses report that people may have had to stay until 1730 or 1800 on occasion, but no later. (Enc. 1, C-16, pg. 8). The IO states that all 18 people interviewed felt the command climate was negative, however, this is blatantly incorrect as noted above. In contrast to the IO indication that positive statements were made from only those who were not in a position to observe negative treatment, three of the positive statements came from: my legal adviser who was in the office environment several times a week; one of my commanders whose office was in close proximity to mine; and an individual whose office was positioned to see or hear most of what went on in the organization each day. The one statement I reviewed out of those provided that was consistently negative came from an individual who by his own admission had infrequent contact with me, frequently missed meetings, and got his information second and third hand.

For this appeal, my attorney compiled a list of questions and sent emails to individuals who worked with me in SPD, and who were either a member of my executive staff or in a position to observe my interaction with the staff on a frequent basis. The statements were solicited with the full knowledge and acquiescence of the SPD legal adviser, (b)(6) & (b)(7)(C) are incredibly candid and I feel give a remarkably accurate picture of the command climate during my tenure. In contrast to the comments highlighted by the IO, many of the witness statements I have provided give very detailed accounts that not only corroborate my impression of the command climate, but also substantiate my suspicions concerning a few of the senior staff: Highlights of those statements are attached and most expressed they would be happy to elaborate on their observations (Enc. 4). It is notable that of the 14 people who volunteered statements, none ever witnessed an inappropriate act on my part and all stated they would work with me again.

4. Conclusions.

a. As a faith-based leader grounded in the Army Values, I routinely communicated and reinforced throughout my command tenure a Regional Vision and T-E-A-M Command/Leadership Philosophy focused on four rally points (teamwork, execution, attitude, and mission); three core attributes (inspired servant leadership, a world class workforce, and superior performance); and four enduring qualities (relevant, ready, responsive, and reliable). Consistent with the Chief of Engineers Vision for USACE to be a "GREAT engineering force of highly disciplined people...[with] disciplined thought and action..."; my Vision for the service members and civilians of the SPD aimed to engender truth, trust, transparency, and accountability.

b. In my command tenure of the SPD, the organization improved and thrived in spite of any problems we may have experienced. I did not receive a single Equal Opportunity complaint or Congressional inquiry, nor did I have any complaints from the local union. I consider my time as commander to have been very productive and positive, and my wife and I made lifelong friends. I approached my command of SPD the way I have approached every assignment in the military-to influence people by providing clear purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission, to improve the organization by moving it forward, and to make a positive contribution.

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c. I regret that of the over 2,300 dedicated civilian and military personnel in the SPD, a relatively select few perceived my actions fostered a negative climate. Profuse unsolicited employee feedback, especially from my executive staff during the final months of my command tenure, and even months after I departed SPD (to include very recent voluntary survey feedback received from civilian and military professionals who served in my headquarters) counterbalance the assertions of these few. As I emphatically explained during my seven hours of testimony to the DAIG on 2 October, 2010, I always strove to treat everyone in my command with dignity and respect- compassionately and professionally. Nevertheless, as a leader and former Inspector General, I acknowledge that I alone am responsible for my actions and their consequences, including perceptions my actions caused among some of the Division's senior leaders, executive administrative staff, and subordinates.

d. The results of the initial subject investigation were ultimately acted upon by the VCSA in 2011. After considering the findings, as well as all other relevant facts and circumstances, he determined the matter warranted neither a reprimand nor any other adverse entry in my Official Military Personnel File (OMPF). I believe that decision was a powerful reflection on my potential to advance and excel as a senior Army leader, and to continue my Army career with honor and success.



SCOTT F. ROCK DONAHUE
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/57

Enclosures

1. Redacted DAIG Investigation Received Pursuant to FOIA Request.
2. BG Donahue Statement.
3. Additional Witness Statements.
4. Statement Highlights.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
1700 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1700

APR 19 2013

US ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL AGENCY
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION-REVIEW
(Case 10-028)

NAME/POSITION: Brigadier General (BG) Scott "Rock" F. Donahue, former Commanding General (CG), US Army Engineer Division, South Pacific (SPD), US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), San Francisco, California

ALLEGATION AND FINDING: BG Donahue failed to foster a healthy command (CMD) climate remains substantiated.

BACKGROUND:

1. On 17 September 2012, BG Donahue requested the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA), direct a reinvestigation into the substantiated allegation in ROI 10-028 that BG Donahue failed to foster a healthy CMD climate. In a written request for reinvestigation, dated 12 October 2012, to Deputy The Inspector General, BG Donahue stated that a select group of senior civilians undermined him and that the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) Agency's findings failed to critically weigh the information provided.

2. The initial investigation into the CMD climate of the SPD was as a result of an anonymous complaint DAIG received on 16 June 2010, through the CG, USACE. The complaint alleged BG Donahue verbally abused, intimidated, and humiliated his civilian staff and treated others unprofessionally. (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C) A preliminary inquiry, DIG 10-00083, approved 24 September 2010, determined that the allegation that BG Donahue failed to treat subordinates with dignity and respect required further investigation. (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C) On 24 September 2010, the VCSA directed DAIG to investigate.

3. On 15 February 2011, the VCSA approved ROI 10-028. On 8 April 2011, the Inspector General (IG), Department of Defense, concurred with the finding of ROI 10-028.

4. BG Donahue served as the CG, SPD, from 21 July 2009 to 7 January 2011. At the time he assumed command, he was the third commander in less than a year. He assumed CMD from Colonel (COL) (b)(7)(C) Retired (Ret), who served as Commander (CDR), SPD, from January 2009 to July 2009. Prior to taking CMD, COL (b)(7)(C) was the Deputy Commander, SPD, and returned to the deputy position

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under BG Donahue. COL (b)(7)(C) served a total of 2 years and 9 months in SPD from August 2007 to May 2010.

5. The SPD Headquarters (HQs) was comprised of 85 personnel. The majority were civilian employees.

6. At the direction of the CG, USACE, the IG, USACE, completed a CMD climate survey of the SPD HQs. The 24 March 2010 survey reflected 53 responses from 85 employees. Twenty pages of the survey included "Employee Comments" that consistently reflected a negative CMD climate and were used as evidence in ROI 10-028.

DOCUMENTS/TESTIMONY:

1. In a 12 October 2012 memorandum to The Inspector General, BG Donahue requested a reinvestigation into the substantiated allegation that he failed to foster a healthy CMD climate. The Inspector General directed that DAIG-Investigations Division treat BG Donahue's request for reinvestigation as a request for reconsideration in accordance with Army Regulation (AR) 20-1, Inspector General Activities and Procedures, dated 29 November 2010. AR 20-1, paragraph 3-12, states that subjects may request reconsideration of IG findings, opinions, judgments, or conclusions in order to alter that finding or conclusion.

2. BG Donahue's request for reinvestigation focused on two principal claims:

a. The first claim: A select group of senior civilians, at least two field grade officers in his HQ, and one subordinate commander undermined his authority by being openly disrespectful and encouraging resistance to his directives and efforts to raise the standards of performance.

b. The second claim: The synopsis of the DAIG findings were fundamentally unfair, misstated the evidence, were incomplete, and failed to critically weigh the information provided (lacked critical analysis and failed to consider bias).

3. On 15 January 2013, in a phone conversation, BG Donahue clarified that his subordinates who he believed undermined his authority were COL (b)(7)(C) Dr. Christine Altendorf, Senior Executive Service (SES), former Director of Programs, SPD; Mr. Andrew Constantaras, SES, former Director, Regional Business Directorate, SPD; and Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) (b)(7)(C) former Deputy CDR, SPD.

a. BG Donahue stated that he was placed in a difficult situation and expressed concerns to his leadership regarding COL (b)(7)(C) remaining in the CMD as his deputy. COL (b)(7)(C) was his former assignments officer and outranked him at one point. He

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believed it was unfair to him and to COL (b)(7)(C) to have her serve as his deputy when she previously served as the Commander, SPD.

b. BG Donahue stated that he was sent to SPD, USACE, to fix the organization. The SPD was the worst out of the nine divisions in USACE, and he knew that the changes he needed to implement were to plans that COL (b)(7)(C) put in place. He kept his chain of CMD informed on what was going on in the CMD. When he first arrived, he was told by a member of his staff that the staff was out to "derail" him. He believed that COL (b)(7)(C) was attempting to countermand his authority. She would hold meetings with the staff after his meetings.

c. He believed that the DAIG investigation did not critically weigh all of the information and misrepresented the CMD climate survey. All organizations were required to have a CMD climate survey. He believed that the survey did not accurately reflect the overall climate of the organization. He extended the window of the survey to allow additional personnel to take the survey, but only a small portion of the CMD participated. He believed a large majority of the staff were satisfied with the CMD climate but did not participate in the survey. BG Donahue stated that the small portion of the CMD that participated in the survey had issues with him, his family, and his faith.

4. In an e-mail, dated 30 January 2013, and in a follow-on phone conversation, BG Donahue provided a briefing on his philosophy titled, "Servant Leadership," that captured his faith-based philosophy on Servant Leadership, the division's mission, and his "Faith, Family & the Force Life Philosophy on balancing priorities." He also included e-mails regarding his coordination for the CMD climate survey.

a. In a 25 January 2013 phone conversation, BG Donahue stated that as a result of the CMD climate survey, he implemented several programs to improve the climate of the organization. He immediately held a meeting and invited the staff to attend. He briefed the results of the survey and opened the meeting up to anyone who had any questions or concerns. He also implemented the first non-attribution feedback portal in which staff personnel could address any concerns they had anonymously. He invited members of the staff to his home for social functions. He also started formal farewell and award ceremonies.

b. BG Donahue indicated that as a result, the staff, including the civilian members, expressed their appreciation for taking time to acknowledge their hard work. He believed the majority of the staff truly appreciated the efforts that he and his wife put forward to build a healthy CMD climate.

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5. In the 12 October 2012 request for a reinvestigation, BG Donahue included statements from 14 current and former employees assigned to the SPD during his tenure. These witness statements were unsworn. (b)(7)(C) a civilian attorney, obtained the following statements on behalf of BG Donahue.

- a. (b)(7)(C) GS-14, (b)(7)(C)
- b. (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) captain and Aide de Camp
- c. LTC (Ret) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) Commander, San Francisco Division (SFD)
- d. (b)(7)(C) GS-5, (b)(7)(C)
- e. (b)(7)(C) GS-14, (b)(7)(C)
(b)(7)(C)
- f. LTC (b)(7)(C) Deputy, SFD, USACE
- g. (b)(7)(C) GS-15 (b)(7)(C)
- h. LTC (b)(7)(C) Commander, SFD
- i. (b)(7)(C) GS-14, (b)(7)(C)
- j. (b)(7)(C) GS-15, (b)(7)(C)
- k. MAJ (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C)
- l. (b)(7)(C) GS-9, (b)(7)(C)
(b)(7)(C)
- m. (b)(7)(C) GS-13, (b)(7)(C)
- n. (b)(7)(C) GS-13, (b)(7)(C)
(b)(7)(C)

6. Of the 14 employees who provided BG Donahue statements, DAIG had previously interviewed 2, (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) during the initial investigation (ROI 10-028). DAIG interviewed (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) during this reconsideration review. (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) were also two of eight employees BG Donahue identified in the initial investigation (ROI 10-028) as potential witnesses who could provide an assessment of the CMD climate. DAIG interviewed five of the eight suggested

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witnesses during the initial investigation, but (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) were not interviewed at that time.

7. In an interview with DAIG for the reconsideration review, on 11 January 2013 and a recall interview on 17 January 2013, (b)(7)(C) testified:

a. The CMD climate under BG Donahue was the worst out of the six commanders he has worked for during his tenure as the (b)(7)(C) USACE. He did not believe that BG Donahue was a good fit for the organization. The best CMD climate was under BG Michael Wehr, the current Commander, SPD, and COL (b)(7)(C). The staff respected COL (b)(7)(C) and was excited when she was selected to be the first female Division Commander in the USACE. They were later disappointed to learn that her assignment was only temporary pending the arrival of BG Donahue. They already heard negative things about BG Donahue and began developing a negative assessment about him before he arrived.

b. (b)(7)(C) believed that the Army made "poor staffing decisions," which polarized the workforce. Instead of COL (b)(7)(C) leaving the organization when BG Donahue became the commander, she stayed to become BG Donahue's deputy. One of the first public statements BG Donahue made to the staff was that the SPD was the worst performing division in the Corps and that the staff and previous commanders were doing things incorrectly. The staff was angered by his statement and felt COL (b)(7)(C) was being disrespected, and their work under COL (b)(7)(C) was being criticized.

c. (b)(7)(C) testified that he believed the poor climate under BG Donahue was also attributed to directives BG Donahue gave that conflicted with established rules and policies that applied to civilians versus military. Most of the workforce was accustomed to the Commander hitting the ground running, but BG Donahue asked questions like "do civilians get Thanksgiving Day off?" He believed that BG Donahue was a "barrier to effective EEO." BG Donahue kept the civilians past their normal work hours, and when it was brought to his attention regarding civilians' time, he stated, "It's my time." When one civilian employee complained of sexual harassment to the Chief of Engineers, BG Donahue contacted the employee's senior rater (an SES) and directed the supervisor to tell the employee to never do that again. He stated that all issues must go through him and that he would decide the course of action. He stated that if the employee who complained did anything like that again, "she would be reprimanded." Once BG Donahue was informed that this guidance was contrary to EEO civil rights policy and that he could not try to intimidate someone making a sexual harassment allegation, he contacted (b)(7)(C) in an agitated state and indicated that (b)(7)(C) was undermining his authority.

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d. In another incident, when BG Donahue was told that he needed to have a series of counselings before he could permanently remove a civilian employee whom he wanted out of the organization, BG Donahue yelled at the staff and called them "enemies of the state." (b)(7)(C) further testified that he witnessed BG Donahue take a report and shake it at (b)(7)(C) GS-15, Division Counsel, and say at the top of his voice that, "this is the sort of junk that comes out of the Office of Counsel and that's why I can't trust my Office of Counsel." (b)(7)(C) testified that BG Donahue did not have an effective or appropriate business communication style at all. BG Donahue would raise his voice and literally shout at the staff and make them feel very small and demeaned.

e. (b)(7)(C) testified that BG Donahue did not initially accept feedback. BG Donahue wanted him to provide names of disloyal front office personnel so that he could validate opinions he already had. (b)(7)(C) testified that military and civilian employees came to him routinely to vent and to air their frustrations or to get clarification on their rights. Some employees came to him very upset and in tears. He believed that they were thinking about filing some type of action against BG Donahue. (b)(7)(C) indicated that people began to not trust their own judgment. (b)(7)(C) testified that these employees were professionals with outstanding performance records and years of experience, but did not feel they could trust their judgment because some of the guidance conflicted with policy or a process that they knew based on their years of experience. The SES personnel had their "flag" too and had "been around the block a time or two." When BG Donahue wanted something done that was contrary to the way the Corps would accomplish the task, the SESs would call their counterparts in DC to complain about BG Donahue and say "that this isn't the way that it's supposed to be." At some point, BG Donahue felt that people were ganging up on him. Employees started lining up with the SESs versus BG Donahue because they felt that they were getting more empathy from them.

f. (b)(7)(C) testified that he would work for BG Donahue again because BG Donahue "was learning" and his intentions were good. BG Donahue was not used to working with civilians, but he got better as time went on. BG Donahue felt the CMD climate survey comments were personal and directed towards his family and that was very hurtful to him. After the survey, BG Donahue attempted to change the way he conducted business, but by the end of his CMD, there were "so many bridges that were burned and so many hurt feelings," that it was too late.

8. In an interview with DAIG for the reconsideration review, (b)(7)(C) testified:

a. He first met BG Donahue in (b)(7)(C)
(b)(7)(C)
(b)(7)(C) He believed that the CMD climate under BG Donahue was the

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best he has ever seen in his (b)(7) years in the military. He was not aware of any CMD climate issues. He heard about the CMD climate survey, but he was not aware of the results and did not recall anything negative as a result of the survey.

b. BG Donahue had a professional and personal leadership style. He did not discriminate and did not use bad language. BG Donahue would raise his voice, but he never heard him yell, point his finger, and/or make anyone cry. BG Donahue implemented a number of programs to improve the climate within the division. He believed that COL (b)(7)(C) and Dr. Altendorf countermanded BG Donahue. He heard that COL (b)(7)(C) would hold meetings after BG Donahue's meetings and that COL (b)(7)(C) and Dr. Altendorf would tell members of the staff not to follow BG Donahue's guidance. He was told that this occurred, but he never heard COL (b)(7)(C) or Dr. Altendorf make these comments firsthand. (b)(7)(C) personally worked 12, and sometimes 20-hour days, but he was not aware of any issues involving civilians working long hours. Sometimes projects ran over, but civilians were compensated with overtime or days off. He believed that people were overall happy with BG Donahue's leadership.

9. During the initial investigation Lieutenant General (LTG) Robert L. Van Antwerp (Ret), CG, USACE, was interviewed on 6 October 2010. LTG Van Antwerp (Ret) testified:

a. He ranked the SPD ninth of nine divisions at that point in time, which was still after BG Donahue's efforts to respond to the CMD climate. LTG Van Antwerp (Ret) attributed the poor ranking of the division to the leadership turbulence prior to BG Donahue's arrival, the problem with BG Donahue not having experience in USACE or civilian organizations, and the culture of the SPD. He received feedback from the SESs that BG Donahue was very hard on people. He also heard quite a bit of negativity from some of the district commanders regarding BG Donahue. BG Donahue had a lot of good ideas, but the manner and style in which he went about implementing his ideas were problematic.

b. As a result of the CMD climate survey, BG Donahue conducted a number of town halls, established an interactive website to get anonymous feedback, and held luncheons that helped. However, he did not know if BG Donahue could turn the command around if he stayed in command. Having him deploy in January 2011 gave the division a new start. He did not believe that he would have BG Donahue serve in another division CMD. He believed that a uniformed military organization would have been a better fit for BG Donahue. BG Donahue prided himself as being a good teacher, but he sometimes did not put a premium on listening. He believed that BG Donahue learned that in an organization like SPD, a lot of what a commander had to do at the beginning was listen, assess, collaboratively talk about the way ahead, and then get people to buy-in to him on what was in the best interest of the organization.

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10. A review of the remaining 12 statements of the 14 witnesses BG Donahue's legal counsel provided indicated that 7 were senior subordinates in the grade of LTC, GS-14, or GS-15. Nine of the twelve (b)(7)(C) LTC (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) LTC (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) MAJ (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) were outside of BG Donahue's direct supervision and or rating chain, and seven of the ten (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) LTC (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) MAJ (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) had indicated that they only saw him once or twice a week or in passing.

a. In the statements BG Donahue provided, all individuals made positive comments about his leadership style, the CMD climate, and his impact on the SPD. Ten of the twelve witnesses (b)(7)(C) COL (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) LTC (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) LTC (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) MAJ (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) had a favorable opinion of BG Donahue's demeanor and all believed that he was accessible. However, (b)(7)(C) heard BG Donahue yelling and speaking harshly to employees, (b)(7)(C) heard rumors of BG Donahue's yelling and speaking harshly to the staff, and LTC (b)(7)(C) heard rumors that BG Donahue was too demanding and very rank conscious.

b. Three witnesses (COL (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) and LTC (b)(7)(C) believed BG Donahue's orders were countermanded; however, seven witnesses (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) LTC (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) indicated that they had no knowledge of this occurring.

(1) COL (b)(7)(C) stated that he heard COL (b)(7)(C) and Dr. Altendorf say to the staff that they were glad BG Donahue was traveling so they would not have to listen to his nonsense. (b)(7)(C) stated that on one occasion individuals did not follow his briefing slide format. LTC (b)(7)(C) stated that he believed that two SESs countermanded BG Donahue, but he could not recall any examples. Although these individuals believed BG Donahue's orders were countermanded, none of them provided any examples of orders that were not followed.

(2) Conversely, (b)(7)(C) stated that two SESs disagreed with BG Donahue, but the SESs were respectful. (b)(7)(C) stated that BG Donahue's orders were never directly countermanded, but he was "slow rolled" in that the senior staff just waited until he left the organization. MAJ (b)(7)(C) also believed that BG Donahue was "slow rolled." (b)(7)(C) and LTC (b)(7)(C) indicated they had no knowledge of BG Donahue's orders being countermanded formally, but indicated that the senior staff was either contemptuous of him or did not support his orders and methods.

c. Six of the twelve witnesses (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) LTC (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) LTC (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) thought that BG Donahue was a good fit for the organization. However, (b)(7)(C) indicated that BG Donahue was not suited for the SPD and that the organization was not meant to be led by "combat type of Soldier,

outwardly focused on his career." (b)(7)(C) indicated that BG Donahue did not have "previous civil works experience," which precipitated a culture clash.

(b)(7)(C) felt it was a "failure on those who made the assignment." (b)(7)(C) indicated that the "spit/polish Army style" clashed with the "free-spirited, give-me-your-intent-and-I-will-figure-it-out style."

d. Four of the twelve witnesses (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) indicated BG Donahue's demeanor changed after the CMD climate survey. (b)(7)(C) stated that BG Donahue made an honest effort to visit staff and to make a personal connection with everyone. (b)(7)(C) stated that he noticed "the softening of the rigor" after the CMD climate survey. However, (b)(7)(C) stated that BG Donahue was hurt by the results of the CMD climate survey and became more reserved and guarded. (b)(7)(C) believed that BG Donahue became insecure and worried about his image after the CMD climate survey. (b)(7)(C) stated that BG Donahue even asked (b)(7)(C) if (b)(7)(C) knew who made an official complaint against him.

e. Eight of the twelve witnesses (b)(7)(C), COL (b)(7)(C), LTC (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(C), LTC (b)(7)(C), LTC (b)(7)(C), LTC (b)(7)(C) and MAJ (b)(7)(C) indicated that they had a favorable assessment of the CMD climate under BG Donahue. Several staff members believed that the senior civilians contributed to the poor climate. (b)(7)(C) felt the climate was poor because it was a challenge to control civilians who wanted the status quo. LTC (b)(7)(C) and LTC (b)(7)(C) indicated that the CMD climate improved after the two SESs left the organization. Conversely, (b)(7)(C) MAJ (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) indicated that the organization was more relaxed after BG Donahue left. (b)(7)(C) indicated that climate was relaxed before BG Donahue arrived and after he left. She stated that "people have calmed down." MAJ (b)(7)(C) indicated that senior staff were relieved after he left. (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) indicated that BG Wehr's personality or approach was better aligned with the office and everyone liked him.

f. All of the witnesses except LTC (b)(7)(C) indicated that they would work for BG Donahue again. However, (b)(7)(C) felt BG Donahue lost sight of his staff, what they were thinking, and how they perceived he treated them. LTC (b)(7)(C) stated he would not work for BG Donahue again because he "increased the stress levels of troubled organizations."

ANALYSIS/DISCUSSION:

1. Although BG Donahue believed that a select group of senior civilians and members of his staff countermanded his authority, no one provided any example of an order BG Donahue gave that was not followed. Witness testimony indicated that they heard rumors, but no one had firsthand knowledge of any order that was not followed.

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BG Donahue and (b)(7)(C) indicated that COL (b)(7)(C) had meetings with the staff after his meetings, but neither had firsthand knowledge of what occurred in the meetings.

2. Several factors contributed to the climate of the organization. The previous peer-subordinate relationship between BG Donahue and COL (b)(7)(C) the poor standing of the SPD compared to other divisions in USACE, and the experience and popularity of COL (b)(7)(C) all played a part of the dynamics affecting the climate of the organization. Although BG Donahue was in CMD, the staff's loyalty and respect remained with COL (b)(7)(C). To transform the organization, BG Donahue needed to change the way the organization operated, which included changing programs that COL (b)(7)(C) implemented or played a role in implementing. LTG Van Antwerp (Ret) indicated that BG Donahue's intentions were good, but the way he went about implementing his changes was problematic.

a. The SPD was a military organization predominantly staffed by civilian employees. The civilian members of the SPD were unaccustomed to what some witnesses described as a "military" style. Specifically, these experienced civilians were normally not accustomed to senior leaders yelling or raising their voice to express their discontent, invading their personal space, keeping them hours past their normal scheduled work hours, and/or demeaning them in front of their peers. Witness testimony, including 3 of the 14 statements BG Donahue provided, also confirmed that he yelled or spoke harshly to the staff. Several witnesses, including (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(D) testified the way BG Donahue spoke to the employees would make the staff feel small and demeaned. (b)(7)(C) stated that some of the staff would have to recover from "an emotional hit" after some of BG Donahue's meetings. He indicated that people would be upset and would want to take a day off, go home early, or come in to his office to talk or get clarification on their rights. He further testified that some were in tears.

b. Witness testimony indicated BG Donahue lacked a full understanding of USACE policies and procedures. In one of the statements BG Donahue provided, LTC (b)(7)(C) indicated that BG Donahue lacked civil works experience, which precipitated a culture clash. (b)(7)(C) testimony indicated that BG Donahue lacked a full understanding of civilian personnel policies and that his guidance often clashed with standard operating procedures and processes. (b)(7)(C) further testified that the SESs were also senior leaders and felt that the guidance they were given also conflicted with established policies and procedures. (b)(7)(C) indicated that the staff began to line up with the SESs for empathy. According to (b)(7)(C) it became an atmosphere of "us versus them." All of these factors further contributed to the CMD climate.

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c. The evidence indicated that BG Donahue was unaware of the extent that some members of the staff were discontented with his leadership until he received the results of the CMD climate survey. The survey included 20 pages, many of which contained negative comments. Some of these comments were personal against him, his family, and his faith. The evidence established that as a result of the survey, BG Donahue implemented several programs and procedures that greatly helped to improve the overall CMD climate of the organization. However, (b)(7)(C) testified that by the time these programs took effect, there were "so many bridges burned and so many hurt feelings" that it was too late. As noted before, LTG Van Antwerp (Ret) in the original ROI testified he did not know if BG Donahue would have been able to turn it around if he had stayed longer in command.

3. Although, BG Donahue stated that the DAIG findings failed to critically weigh the information provided, the additional evidence BG Donahue provided did not effectively refute the evidence presented in the original investigation nor did it refute the conclusion of the original investigation. A review of the evidence indicated the assessment of the CMD climate was accurate based on a preponderance of evidence.

a. BG Donahue's background discussion in his 12 October 2012 memorandum indicated the SPD was dysfunctional prior to his arrival and prone to significant leadership turnover. He detailed the steps he took in preparation for assuming CMD, the challenges the CMD had with its poor ranking among the other divisions, the high turnover of senior leaders, and the programs he implemented to improve the command and the CMD climate. However, none of those matters changed the fact that while in CMD, BG Donahue failed to foster a healthy CMD climate.

(1) BG Donahue claimed that the Investigation Officer's (IO's) conclusion was "blatantly incorrect" in stating that 18 witnesses felt the CMD climate was negative. That statement from the original ROI referred to the 18 witnesses who either commented on or observed negative treatment by BG Donahue. After reviewing the 25 witness testimonies in the ROI, the 14 statements BG Donahue's legal counsel submitted, and the 2 additional witness interviews conducted in the reconsideration review (a total of 41 interviews and 39 witnesses), the evidence indicated that 9 of 39 witnesses made definitive statements that the CMD climate was good. However, other witnesses, including three BG Donahue provided indicated that BG Donahue yelled at employees and did not believe he was a good fit for the organization.

(2) Although BG Donahue believed the CMD climate survey was flawed in that only disgruntled employees participated, he indicated in the 12 October 2012 memorandum that the results generally tracked with the USACE average on 32 areas, were below average in 7 areas, and were above average in 1 area. The areas below average reflected that approximately only 30 percent of the employees agreed that positive workplace changes occurred in the last year, that morale was good, that the

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workload was distributed evenly, that the CDR had an open door policy and unobstructed access to him, and that the CDR had an effective system to receive feedback from employees. Conversely, BG Donahue did not mention that the CMD climate survey also contained 20 pages of "Employee Comments," 17 of which contained negative comments about the CMD climate under BG Donahue, his leadership, and his treatment of subordinates.

(3) The CMD climate survey was completed in March 2010, eight months into BG Donahue's CMD. Although BG Donahue testified to taking immediate action to resolve the issues, DAIG received complaints about BG Donahue's climate, leadership, and treatment of subordinates in June and July 2010 respectively, over a year after BG Donahue assumed CMD. Additionally, the majority of witness interviews in ROI 10-028 were completed between July and December 2010, well into BG Donahue's second year in CMD. BG Donahue's analysis of the CMD climate survey did not undermine the ROI's conclusion that BG Donahue failed to foster a healthy CMD climate, and in fact supported some of the evidence that led to the conclusion.

b. BG Donahue's claim that the IO's conclusions relied on witnesses who were biased is not supported by the evidence obtained in the ROI, the 14 additional statements provided by BG Donahue, and the two additional witness interviews. This group of 39 represents a wide spectrum of witnesses in BG Donahue's inner circle and from those outside.

c. BG Donahue claimed that the IO's conclusions were based on secondhand reports or opinions from the three or four witnesses who were biased towards him. BG Donahue also asserted that there was not a single substantiated incident cited in the report as a firsthand account. The incidents of alleged mistreatment of subordinates referenced by BG Donahue in the original ROI were not the principal basis for the IO's findings. Those incidents were used as examples related to dignity and respect and were part of the basis for the IO's findings on CMD climate. Other evidence, including testimony from LTG Van Antwerp (Ret) and (b)(7)(C) of the four district CDRs, helped to corroborate the IO's analysis of an unhealthy CMD climate. LTG Antwerp (Ret) testified that he received feedback from the SESs that BG Donahue was very hard on people. He also heard quite a bit of negativity from some of the district commanders regarding BG Donahue. All four of the district commanders were interviewed during the original investigation. (b)(7)(C) of the four district CDRs made negative comments about BG Donahue's CMD climate, leadership, or treatment of subordinates. (b)(7)(C) further stated they would not work for BG Donahue again.

(1) The ROI reflected what evidence could be verified regarding some of the reported incidents such as BG Donahue making subordinates cry. (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) SPD, testified that she saw (b)(7)(C)

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(b)(7)(C) GS-13, (b)(7)(C) crying after a 90-minute meeting with BG Donahue. (b)(7)(C) testified that BG Donahue was incredibly intimidating and demoralizing to the staff. She cried on multiple occasions for the first time in her career. (b)(7)(C) GS-14, (b)(7)(C) testified that BG Donahue berated employees by getting into their personal space and screaming. He witnessed employees crying. (b)(7)(C) also confirmed that after meetings with BG Donahue, members of the staff came to his office in tears.

(2) (b)(7)(C) also confirmed the testimony of COL (b)(7)(C) District Commander, who testified that BG Donahue held long meetings. These meetings were described by other witnesses who testified that BG Donahue was abusive of their time. (b)(7)(C) testified when informed about civilians and their time, BG Donahue stated, "It's my time."

d. In the original DAIG investigation, BG Donahue claimed the IO did not ask him to provide names of other witnesses who could corroborate his version of events. However, at the end of BG Donahue's interview on 2 October 2010, BG Donahue provided DAIG with eight names of suggested witnesses. Of those eight, the IO interviewed five. After a total of 26 witness interviews, the IO concluded the investigation on BG Donahue. However, (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(C) were also among the eight names that BG Donahue provided. They were not interviewed during the initial investigation, but were interviewed as a part of the reconsideration review. (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(C), and (b)(7)(C) were witnesses BG Donahue provided. Their testimonies clarified the CMD climate of the organization and further corroborated the substantiated allegation against him.

CONCLUSION: BG Donahue assumed command of the SPD at a time in which the former CG, USACE, described the division as ninth of nine divisions in USACE. The poor standing of the division was attributed to the leadership turbulence prior to BG Donahue's arrival, the problem with BG Donahue not having experience in USACE or civilian organizations, and the culture of the SPD. BG Donahue attempted to take corrective action to improve the division's overall standing; however, he was unaware of the extent that some members of his staff were discontented with his leadership until he received the results of a CMD climate survey. BG Donahue took action in an attempt to improve the climate of the organization. He implemented several policies and programs that enhanced the overall CMD climate, but witness testimony indicated that his attempts were too late.

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the substantiation of allegation that BG Donahue failed to foster a healthy CMD climate remain unchanged.
2. The allegation against BG Donahue in the DAIG database remain substantiated.
3. File this report with ROI 10-028.

(b)(7)(C)

Investigator

APPROVED:



PETER M. VANGJEL
Lieutenant General, USA
The Inspector General

COORDINATION:

IN Legal	Initials:	(b)(7)(C)
Chief PI	Initials:	
IG Legal	Initials:	
Chief IN Div	Initials:	

Date: 20130213
Date: 20130326
Date: 18 APR 2013
Date: 18 APR 13

Encls

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LIST OF EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT ITEM

A Authority/Complaint

- A-1: Complaint, BG Donahue's rebuttal to The Inspector General, DAIG, dated 13 May 2010
- A-2: Legal Reviews

B Standard: AR 20-1, paragraph 3-12

C Documents

- C-1: 14 Statements in support of BG Donahue's rebuttal request
- C-2: E-mail, dated 30 Jan 13, subject: Official Matters, from BG Donahue
- C-3: Briefing, subject: Servant Leadership, dated 12 Aug 10
- C-4: E-mails, dated 1 Mar 10, subject: SPD CMD Climate Survey, from BG Donahue
- C-5: E-mail, dated 12 Mar 10, subject: CMD Climate Survey - Deadline extended, from COL (b)(7)(C)
- C-6: E-mail, dated 31 Mar 10, subject: CMD Climate Survey, from BG Donahue
- C-7: E-mail, dated 24 Sep 10, subject: Commander's Suggestion Box - Friday, September 24, 2010 3:14 PM (no Action), from LTC (b)(7)(C) Deputy Commander, South Pacific Division
- C-8: E-mail, dated 8 Jan 11, subject: FINAL ROCK SENDS - Farewell Message, from BG Donahue
- C-9: Line and block chart of 39 witnesses interviewed by DAIG and BG Donahue's legal representative
- C-10: ROI 10-028 Statement Highlights
- C-11: CMD Climate Survey, dated 24 March 2010
- C-12: MFR, Testimony, LTC (b)(7)(C) dated 3 December
- C-13: Complaints, dated in June, July, 2010
- C-14: DAIG Evidence Matrix, Summary of the 14 Statements Provided on Behalf of BG Donahue, and DAIG Evidence Matrix, expanded 4 December 2012
- C-15: SPD 2010 Organizational Chart
- C-16: Freedom of Information Act Records Release Documents, dated 10 Sep 12
- C-17: ROI 10-028 (base report only), approved 15 February
- C-18: IG, DOD Concurrence memorandum, dated April 8, 2011

D Testimony/Statement

- D-1: (b)(7)(C) FOIA: No
- D-2: FOIA: No
- D-3: FOIA: No

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D-4: LTG Van Antwerp (Ret)
D-5: (b)(7)(C)
D-6: (b)(7)(C)
D-7: (b)(7)(C)
D-8: BG Donahue

FOIA: No
FOIA: No
FOIA: No
FOIA: No
FOIA: N/A