

1. (U//FOUO) SECARMY Appointment Memorandum. On 16 December 2010, Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh appointed LTG Robert L. Caslen, Jr., Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, as an Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigating Officer (IO). LTG Caslen was instructed to conduct a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary, and independent administrative investigation into the facts and circumstances associated with the suspected compromise of classified national security information by Private First Class (PFC) Bradley E. Manning to the WikiLeaks organization.

2. Specifically, LTG Caslen was to investigate the following areas:

a. The circumstances under which PFC Manning was:

(1) Accessed into the U.S. Army.

(2) Classified in the Military Occupational Specialty of 35F, Intelligence Analyst.

(3) Granted eligibility for access to Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).

(4) Assigned to the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York.

b. The facts and circumstance associated with the decision to deploy PFC Manning to Iraq in October 2009.

c. The processes employed and enforced by the unit to which PFC Manning was assigned in Iraq and in his secured workplace pertaining to:

(1) Personnel.

(2) Operations.

(3) Physical security.

(4) Information security.

(5) Information technology.

(6) Information assurance.

d. The manner in which PFC Manning's performance, behavior, health, and other concerns were addressed, both prior to and throughout his deployment.

e. Any other material issue within the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Army that may have facilitated or contributed to PFC Manning's alleged involvement in the WikiLeaks incident.

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f. Whether the Army has the best qualified personnel serving in military intelligence specialties.

g. Whether the Army adequately vets, both initially and periodically thereafter, those given access to highly classified national security information.

h. Whether the measures pertaining to Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Facilities (SCIFs) are adequate with respect to:

- (1) Personnel.
- (2) Operations.
- (3) Physical security.
- (4) Information security.
- (5) Information technology.
- (6) Information assurance

i. What the Army could or should have done to identify, anticipate, deter, or prevent the alleged insider threat and compromise of classified information to WikiLeaks.

j. Whether there are other Army systems, programs, policies, procedures or conditions that may have facilitated or contributed, directly or indirectly to the WikiLeaks incident.

k. What, if any, measures should be taken to remedy specific deficiencies or gaps in Army programs, policies, procedures or conditions that may exist, either systemically or as applied to this particular incident.

l. LTG Robert Caslen was also instructed to identify and, as appropriate, take action with regard to any person who should be held accountable for failures or deficiencies-to include the exercise of poor judgment-in applying Army programs, policies or procedures to PFC Manning.

3. Investigative Methodology. The investigative team conducted a comprehensive review of the June 2010 Report of a Preliminary Inquiry directed by the Commander, U.S. Division-Central (USD-C), under provisions of AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program; and the July 2010 United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) investigation under the provisions of AR 15-6. Additionally, the investigative team reviewed a wide variety of background documents and statements relevant to this investigation. When possible, documentary evidence was obtained from other investigations into the alleged disclosures of classified security information to

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WikiLeaks, including an ongoing criminal investigation into PFC Manning's alleged actions.

a. Coordination with Criminal Investigation.

(1) **Witness Interviews.** Witness interviews were conducted by the investigative team after coordination with criminal investigators in the WikiLeaks case and prosecutors in U.S. v. PFC Bradley Manning. Criminal investigators placed witnesses into categories determining access to the investigative team. Category I permitted the investigative team to interview witnesses without restriction. Category II required the investigative team to refrain from witness interviews until after criminal investigators completed interviews with the witness. Category III walled the investigative team off from witnesses after a determination that contact between the witness and members of the investigative team could harm either the prosecution of PFC Manning or ongoing criminal investigations.

(2) **Unavailable Witnesses.** Mr. (b) (6), (b) (7) (PFC Manning's close friend), Mrs. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PFC Manning's Aunt), and PFC Manning (Article 31 Rights invocation) were the only three witnesses that remained in Category III throughout this investigation. As far as the investigative can determine, the unavailability of these two witnesses did not adversely impact the integrity of this investigation.

(3) **Non-Interference with Criminal Prosecution.** All witness interviews were executed with the knowledge of the prosecutors in U.S. v. PFC Bradley Manning and upon determination that the investigative team would not interfere with the criminal investigation and any potential future criminal prosecution(s).

b. **Lines of Effort.** The investigative team allocated assets into three general lines of effort:

(1) Developing an understanding of the circumstances surrounding PFC Manning's alleged disclosure of national security information.

(2) Determining the chain of command oversight and involvement in issues affecting PFC Manning's actions and implementation of appropriate Army policies and procedures.

(3) Conducting a systematic review of institutional programs, policies, procedures, and conditions and recommending modifications and changes, as appropriate.

c. **Subject Matter Experts.** The investigative team included subject matter experts in the areas of physical security, intelligence, MOS 35F training programs, information security, mental health and information assurance.

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d. **Organizations Contacted During Investigation.** This investigation considered testimonial evidence from over 100 personnel relevant to the investigation. The personnel included personnel assigned to 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (2/10 MTN) prior to, and during, PFC Manning's deployment to Iraq. Additional interviews were conducted of personnel from the 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Armored Division, United States Forces-Iraq, Fort Leonard Wood, Fort Huachuca, Fort Gordon, Department of the Army (DA) G-2, OTJAG, CID, IRTF and MEDCOM. The investigative team also spoke with Dr. Mark Sageman, a forensic psychologist and special assistant to the DA G-2. All possible efforts were made to memorialize interviews in writing.

4. All efforts were made to ensure that all relevant witnesses were interviewed and all relevant regulations and documents were reviewed.