



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY ACCESSIONS COMMAND/
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL FOR INITIAL MILITARY TRAINING
90 INGALLS ROAD, BUILDING 100
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651-1065

ATAL-C

23 December 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Army Accessions Command, Fort Monroe
VA 23651

SUBJECT: Results of Informal AR 15-6 Investigation -- Command Climate within the Houston
Recruiting Battalion

1. On 14 October 2008, I was appointed to conduct an AR 15-6 investigation to examine the circumstances surrounding the suicide of four Soldiers assigned to the Houston Recruiting Battalion from January 2005 to September 2008, assess the current command climate and the command climate as it existed at all times relevant to each of the four suicides, and make specific findings and recommendations in accordance with my appointment memorandum. My report is organized as follows:

a. Background, methodology, summary of suicides

b. Examination of the four suicides in terms of the following factors:

(1) Personal factors: financial, personal relationships, medical, and previous attempts/gestures;

(2) Organizational factors: command climate, which includes stress of recruiting mission, work hour policies, recruiter missioning procedures, training policies, and leadership styles

(3) Institutional factors: process of receiving an assignment to US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), post-deployment reintegration and mental health assessments and access to mental health care, other services, and peer support networks for geographically dispersed personnel

c. Findings and recommendations

2. Background - The Army Recruiting Mission

a. USAREC has the mission of providing the strength for the US Army. This mission has always been challenging, and the recent recruiting environment has made it even more difficult. Propensity for military service among the nation's youth has been steadily declining since Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom began. Concurrently, the economy has been

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healthy and unemployment has been low for the past several years (save the last few months) and abundant opportunities for young people exist outside the uniformed services.

b. USAREC employs approximately 7,000 full time Soldiers to recruit for the Regular Army and approximately 1,700 Soldiers to recruit for the US Army Reserve. USAREC prospects and recruits citizens to meet the Army's accession mission. In recent years, the Regular Army accession mission has been approximately 80,000 new enlisted Soldiers each year. The mission is specific in the "quality" marks USAREC must achieve; specifically, USAREC is given a minimum quota for the number of high school diploma graduates and recruits who score in the upper half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), and a maximum limit is established for the number of recruits scoring in the lowest acceptable AFQT category (IV). This accession mission is translated to a contract mission that is assigned through the brigades, battalions and companies to the recruiting station level. Recruiters in each station are given individual goals to write enlistment contracts that enables each station meet its mission.

c. Recruiters are detailed for an assignment to USAREC from across other Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) in the Army, typically for a three-year assignment. If a detailed recruiter demonstrates proficiency at recruiting citizens for the Army and desires to become a career recruiter, he or she may convert to the 79R MOS. There are approximately 3,000 79R career recruiters in the Army primarily filling leadership and staff positions throughout USAREC.

d. Both detailed and career recruiters describe an assignment to USAREC as a stressful, challenging job that is wholly driven by production, that is, the numbers of people put into the Army each month. They talk of how different recruiting duty is from their previous Army experience, of the constancy of the mission--finish a production month on one day, start the next production month the next day; they joke of going "from hero to zero" within a period of a few days. It is this environment that provides the context for my examination of the command climate in the Houston Recruiting Battalion.

3. Methodology. During the course of this investigation, interviews and statements were taken from unit leadership, both professional (79R) and detailed recruiters, and staff officers both within and outside USAREC. I examined the reports, statements, and other exhibits from all four Line of Duty investigations, and collected all IG reports, EO and command sensing sessions, and other reports pertinent to the subject of this investigation. I received assistance and advice from the following individuals:

a. (b)(6), former USAREC Brigade Commander and now (b)(6)
(b)(6)

b. A Crisis Response Team (CRT), deployed to Houston at the request of (b)(6)
(b)(6), 5th Recruiting Brigade. The team members were (b)(6),

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Recruiting & Retention School (RRS), Army Recruiter Course Psychologist; (b)(6)
(b)(6), USAREC Inspector General Office; and (b)(6), USAREC Command Chaplain. The CRT deployed to the Houston Recruiting Battalion from 14-28 October 2008.

c. BG Rhonda Cornum, Director, Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, Department of the Army G3/5/7.

d. BG Timothy Adams, Assistant Surgeon General for Force Projection, Office of The Surgeon General of the Army (OTSG)

e. (b)(6), Director of Behavioral Health Proponency, OTSG

f. (b)(6), USAREC G1 office

g. (b)(6), US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Inspector General Office

h. (b)(6) TRADOC Staff Judge Advocate's Office

i. (b)(6), Commandant, Recruiting and Retention School (RRS)

j. (b)(6), USAREC Command Psychologist and Director, Center One. Center One operates under the direction of USAREC's Command Psychologist, a special staff officer to the CG, USAREC. The organization provides leader development training and recruiter screening services to the RRS.

k. (b)(6), Program Manager, Army OneSource

l. (b)(6) and (b)(6), Army Suicide Prevention Task Force, DA G1

4. Summary of the Four Suicides in the Houston Recruiting Battalion, January 2005 to September 2008

a. CPT Rico Robinson was the Battalion S1 when he committed suicide by a self-inflicted gunshot wound between the dates of 15-18 January 2005. A Line of Duty investigation was initiated by (b)(6), 5th Brigade Commander, and conducted by (b)(6) (b)(6), then the (b)(6) (b)(6). The Investigating Officer found CPT Robinson's suicide to be the result of a "combination of medical, relationship, career and financial issues experienced in ... a short span of time." He left a note that only discusses

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his failed relationship with his girlfriend and recent (b)(3) as reasons for his suicide.¹

b. SSG Nils Aron Andersson was a detailed recruiter assigned to (b)(6) Recruiting Station, (b)(6) Recruiting Company, when he committed suicide by a self-inflicted gunshot wound on 6 March 2007. A line of duty investigation was completed by (b)(6) and approved by the appointing authority, (b)(6), 5th Brigade Commander, on 10 April 2008. The investigation found SSG Andersson's suicide to be the result of a "combination of medical, relationship, career and financial issues experienced in ... a short span of time."²

c. SSG (posthumously promoted to SFC) Larry G. Flores was the 79R Station Commander, (b)(6) Recruiting Station, (b)(6) Recruiting Company when he committed suicide by hanging at his home on the evening of 8 August 2008. The line of duty investigation conducted by (b)(6) has not been finally approved UP AR 600-8-4, pending the results of this investigation.

d. SFC Patrick Henderson was a detailed recruiter assigned to the (b)(6) Recruiting Station, (b)(6) Recruiting Company when he committed suicide by hanging on 20 September 2008. (b)(6)
(b)(6) The line of duty investigation conducted by (b)(6) has not been finally approved UP AR 600-8-4, pending the results of this investigation.

5. Examination of factors relevant to the four suicides from January 2005 to September 2008. This investigation examined events and environmental factors in both the personal and professional lives of these Soldiers; examination of personal factors included financial, medical, personal relationships, work-induced pressures, performance in recruiting duty, and interaction with leadership. I also examined organizational factors, primarily within the Houston Recruiting Battalion and the 5th Recruiting Brigade. These factors included leadership styles, command climate, unit policies, missioning procedures, suicide prevention training and the unit's actions upon each suicide. Finally, I looked at institutional factors, to include the selection process for recruiting duty, access to medical/mental health care and other services for Soldiers stationed outside a military installation's footprint, Army policies for reintegration of redeploying Soldiers, and aspects of the Army's Suicide Prevention Program training.

¹ EX 1: CPT Robinson suicide note, Line of Duty Investigation - CPT Robinson (Vol 1, Tab J)

² EX 2: Report of Line of Duty Investigation - SSG Andersson (Vol 2)

³ At the time of my appointment, (b)(6), 5th Recruiting Brigade, was in the course of conducting a line of duty investigation into the suicide of SSG Larry Flores (Vol 3)

⁴ At the time of my appointment, (b)(6) Recruiting Company, was conducting a line of duty investigation of the suicide of SFC Henderson (Vol 4)

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6. Personal Factors

a. **Financial.** I reviewed each Soldier's last six months of Leave and Earnings Statements (LES). Family members and co-workers were interviewed to ascertain financial hardships that might not be reflected in the LES. I found some evidence that CPT Robinson may have experienced some stress from a financial obligation with regard to the mortgage on his home. Although the other individuals carried some debt in varying amounts, none of the facts adduced in this investigation indicate that they were adversely affected by the stress of a financial burden at the time they committed suicide.

(1) CPT Robinson made mention of his mortgage debt in an e-mail to a friend shortly before his death.⁵ CPT Robinson's brother told the Investigating Officer about CPT Robinson's unpaid credit card debt, though he was not specific about the amounts owed.⁶

(2) SSG Andersson's (b)(6) Otherwise, he did not appear to have financial challenges. Members of his chain of command and other recruiters in the unit say he never sought assistance or mentioned having a problem with finances.⁷

(3) SFC Flores did not appear to have significant financial issues.

(4) SFC Henderson was in (b)(6) (b)(6) His wife indicated she handled the family's finances and that she didn't consider their burden to be excessive and did not feel finances were a contributing factor in his suicide.⁸

b. **Personal relationships.** Significantly, all four victims were involved in personal relationships that they perceived as failed or failing.

(b)(6)

⁵ EX 3: CPT Robinson e-mail, 4 Jan 05 (Vol 1, Tab Y)

⁶ EX 4: (b)(6) interview with (b)(6) (Vol 1, Tab X)

⁷ EX 5: (b)(6) (Vol 2, Tabs E, F)


⁸ EX 6: (b)(6), p. 2 (Vol 4, Tab JJ)

⁹ EX 7: Police Dispatch Log, 13 Jan 05 (Vol 1, Tab N)

¹⁰ EX 8: (b)(6) interview with (b)(6) (Vol 1, Tab D); EX 9: Police report 05-1194, p. 2 (Vol 1, Tab F)

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(b)(6)

c. **Medical.** A review of available medical records and mental health records was performed by (b)(6) Director of Behavioral Health Proponency, OTSG. Her review indicated that

(b)(3)

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- ¹¹ EX 1: CPT Robinson suicide note (Vol 1, Tab J)
 - ¹² EX 10: (b)(6) interview with (b)(6) (Vol 2, Tab H)
 - ¹³ EX 11: CID report, incorporating Houston PD report pp. 2.011-2.012 (Vol 2, Tab I)
 - ¹⁴ EX 12: Incident Information Report, p.2 (Vol 2, Tab D)
 - ¹⁵ EX 13: SSG Flores E-mail to (b)(6), 8 Aug 08 (Vol 3, Tab 26)
 - ¹⁶ EX 14: BG Turner interview w/ (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 6)

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

d. Previous suicide gestures or ideations.

(b)(6)


(b)(6)

²¹EX 8: (b)(6) interview w/ (b)(6) (Vol 1, Tab D)

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

7. Organizational factors. This investigation examined the leadership, command climate, policies and training within the Houston Recruiting Battalion. Where appropriate, I looked at the corresponding areas in the 5th Recruiting Brigade and USAREC HQs. A poor command climate has existed within the Houston battalion over the past several years. The climate has been fostered by the leadership styles of several senior leaders, an unhealthy and singular focus on production at the expense of Soldier and Family considerations, persistent long hours and weekend duty with no predictability of time-off.

²² EX 12: Incident Information Report, Block 31.a (Vol 2, Tab D); EX 18: (b)(6) 21 Mar 06 (Vol 2, Tab G);

EX 10: (b)(6) interview w, (b)(6) (Vol 2, Tab H)

²³ EX 18: (b)(6) 21 Mar 06 (Vol 2, Tab G)

²⁴ EX 6: (b)(6), pp.3-4 (Vol 4, Tab JJ)

²⁵ EX 19: Medical Records, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

²⁶ EX 20: (b)(3) (Vol 4, Tab EE)

²⁷ EX 21: (b)(6) (Vol 3, Tab 11)

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a. **Other command climate investigations reported evidence of low morale.** My investigation confirmed the opinions expressed by current and former members of the Houston Battalion in several previous investigations, inspections, and sensing sessions dating back to 2006. These previous inquiries found ample evidence of low morale, poor command climate, and significant lack of respect for both company and battalion leaders across the battalion over a long period of time. Previous investigations, inspections, and sensing sessions are summarized below:

(1) IG inspections of the Houston Recruiting Battalion (2 sessions), 7-10 March 2006 and 23-26 October 2006. The March 2006 inspection noted below average morale, with recruiters reporting micromanagement by company leadership teams.²⁸ The CG, USAREC directed several items to be re-inspected during a follow-up inspection. That occurred during the regularly scheduled October 2006 inspection which noted improved morale with the exception of (b)(6) Company (the lower morale of which was related to a incident unspecified in the EO report).²⁹

(2) March 2007 Staff Assistance Visit by Family Readiness Group assistant. Ms. (b)(6) found morale low in March 2007 and not any better in August 2008.³⁰

(b)(6)

²⁸ EX 22: (b)(6) e-mail to (b)(6) dtd 15 Mar 06 (Vol 5, Tab 3)

²⁹ EX 23: (b)(6) e-mail to MG Bostick dtd 1 Nov 06 (Vol 5, Tab 4)

³⁰ EX 24: (b)(6) p.2 (Vol 6, Tab 2)

³¹ EX 25: AR 15-6 Report of Investigation – (b)(6) 3 Apr 07 (Vol 6, Tab 12)

³² EX 26: AR 15-6 Report of Investigation-- (b)(6) 14 Jan 08 (Vol 5, Tab 7)

³³ EX 27: CG, USAREC memorandum of reprimand issued to (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 7)

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(5) In an Equal Opportunity (EO) sensing session of (b)(6) Companies, 9-10 July, dtd 12 July 2008, (b)(6) EO Counselor, concluded that morale in the unit was "moderately low."³⁴

(6) USAREC Chaplain's visit to (b)(6) Recruiting Company, 21-27 Sep 08. The Chaplain's findings during his visit are very similar to what my investigation found. Recruiters mentioned the long work hours with no predictability of time off, their fear of reprisal for speaking out, and the widespread distrust of battalion leadership. Some described the bad relationship between the (b)(6) and (b)(6) and the negative affect it had on the (b)(6) authority in the company.³⁵

(7) Sensing Session conducted by USAREC CRT, 14 -24 Oct 08.³⁶ The CRT found that Soldiers throughout the battalion believed that their long work hours prevent them from maintaining strong family relationships. The long hours were described as "unnecessary" and used as a "test [of their] work ethic." Work hours and stress were the predominant complaints across the board. Soldiers expressed dissatisfaction with the leadership abilities of 79Rs and blamed much of their stress on poor leadership. Soldiers with recent deployment experience explained that they were under the impression that recruiting duty would be a slower-paced, family-oriented change from the OPTEMPO of the deployed environment. Impressions of the

(b)(6), (b)(7)b

b. Work Hours and Time Off Policy. My investigation identified multiple recruiters and leaders who provided both specific examples and general comments on the hours worked by recruiters in the Houston battalion. Recruiters in Houston Recruiting Battalion feel they work unreasonable hours and have very limited time for family / personal needs. I heard many comments, as did the CRT during their sensing sessions, of workdays that started at 0600 hrs and often ended after midnight. A routine day seemed to run from approximately 0800 – 2100 hrs. Many complained of working every Saturday (some cases Sunday) and rarely being able to plan on having a weekend free. Some, including officers, made allegations of leaves being denied for no cogent reason or leaves being returned to Soldiers with no action or reason given.

(1) (b)(6) was aware of complaints about stress and long work hours. He published his 2 March 2007 policy for work hours and time off, prompted by various emails,

³⁴ EX 28: Houston Recruiting Battalion Sensing Session Results (Vol 6, Tab 5)

³⁵ EX 29: Chaplain's Trip Report, (b)(6) Company (Vol 5, Tab 2)

³⁶ EX 30: Results of Crisis Response Team Visit to the Houston Recruiting Bn, 15-24 October 2008 (Vol 5, Tab 1)

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surveys, command climate feedback, and telephone calls over several preceding months.³⁷ (b)(6) wrote in his policy that he was trying to achieve balance between work and family time. The policy includes a “guarantee that there will be zero retaliation for any feedback” and that any deviation from the policy would require his approval.³⁸ The policy included:

(a) “Duty day ends at 1800 and not to exceed 13 hours and not to exceed 13 hours for rest of the recruiting contract mission (RCM) for individual recruiters that achieve their RCM net mission accomplishment (two per).”³⁹

(b) Duty day for anyone in the battalion not to exceed 13 hours and hours cannot be carried over to the next day or week...The clock starts when you arrive at PT or office or first duty appointment/event.

(c) Minimum one weekend (Saturday and Sunday) per RCM off per recruiter.

(d) Deviations on duty day/weekend restrictions must be briefed by each company commander and/or first sergeant at the battalion command and staff meeting each week, including anyone who has to work past 2100 on any given day.

(2) However, there is some evidence that the policy caused confusion or met resistance. In his 3 April 2007 AR 15-6 investigation, (b)(6) opined that the policy as written could be misconstrued as requiring a 13 hour work day rather than limiting work hours, which was the intent.⁴⁰ In a 10 June 2007 memo addressed to the brigade commander (b)(6), CG, USAREC directed the battalion commander to rescind his Leave Pass and Time Off Policy dated 2 March 07, Battalion Policy #13 and replace it with one that is clearly consistent with Army regulations.⁴¹ Neither the 5th Brigade nor the Houston Battalion executed this instruction.

(3) (b)(6) reviewed his policy memorandum for the first time in July 2008. He reported to (b)(6) that he was unaware of the USAREC CG’s directive until over a year later, around the time of (b)(6) change of command, when he was informed by the brigade EO officer and by (b)(6).⁴² On 2 July 2008, (b)(6) sent an e-mail message to (b)(6) and all the company commanders and first sergeants that included the following:

³⁷ EX 31: Policy Letter #13 (Vol 6, Tab R)

³⁸ EX 31: Policy Letter #13, para 3 (Vol 6, Tab R)

³⁹ The awkward wording of this policy is addressed in paragraph 7.b(2) below.

⁴⁰ EX 25: AR 15-6 Report of Investigation – (b)(6), 3 Apr 07, para 6.b (Vol 6, Tab 12)

⁴¹ EX 32: CG, USAREC Memo, 10 Jun 07, para 2.d (Vol 6, Tab 12) (b)(6) was not an addressee on this memorandum)

⁴² EX 33: (b)(6) interview with (b)(6), pp. 1-2 (1945, 11 Oct 08) (Vol 6, Tab 15)

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In the last month, I've received too many calls on key leaders violating our duty day policy (i.e., bringing folks in at 0530-0630 in the morning and folks not leaving until 2100-2200 at night, no full weekend off each phase line, random calls to home to get folks back to work at odd hours, etc). Whatever the excuse is unacceptable to me so consider this email a counseling to all and any further violations will require face to face with me. No one is authorized to violate our duty day policy without my approval. No exceptions!⁴³

(b)(7)b, (b)(6)

(6) In (b)(6)'s 9-10 July 2008 EO sensing session, recruiters complained that the battalion commander's work policy was being abused by the station commanders and company leadership teams. Company leadership teams and station commanders expressed

⁴³ EX 34: (b)(6) e-mail to battalion leaders, 2 Jul 08 (Vol 6, Tab 9)

⁴⁴ EX 35: (b)(6), 28 Oct 08, pp. 10-12 (Vol 5, Tab B)

⁴⁵ EX 36: (b)(6) 27 Oct 08, pp. 14-15 (Vol 5, Tab E)

⁴⁶ EX 37: E-mail from (b)(6) to (b)(6) dtd 15 Jul 08 (Vol 5, Tab D); *compare to* EX 34, battalion commander's 2 Jul 08 e-mail restating his intent with regard to work hours and time off (Vol 6, Tab 19); EX 38: BG Turner interview with (b)(6)

⁴⁷ EX 39: E-mail from (b)(6) to (b)(6), 30 Jul 08 (Vol 6, Tab R)

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frustration that recruiters were too focused on the 13-hour rule not focused enough on the mission.⁴⁸

(b)(7)b, (b)(6)

(8) (b)(6) SFC Flores, reported that SFC Flores would often work from 0400 until 2200, stating that he was a failure at work and that he “couldn’t take it anymore.”⁵⁰ (b)(6), who worked in SFC Flores’s recruiting station, said that she noticed a change in him when she returned from leave on 8 August 2008. SFC Flores seemed tired and stressed. He told her that he had to report to work at 0630 and was not leaving work until 2200.⁵¹ These extended hours were necessary to comply with (b)(6)’s 0700 and 2000 hrs conference calls.

c. Leadership styles

(1) Some leaders are perceived as being uncaring and inconsiderate of family / personal needs. Specific examples were provided, to include: (b)(7)b, (b)(6)

(b)(7)b, (b)(6)

(2) Recommendations from (b)(6)’s 9-10 July 2008 sensing session included “treat Soldiers with dignity and respect” and “eliminate leading by intimidation and threats.”⁵⁴ Soldiers feared reprisals for making negative comments about company leadership teams. Time cards were used in two companies to track recruiters’ work hours. In one company, incentive programs (e.g., time off for writing contracts) were not honored.⁵⁵

(3) During my interview with (b)(6), he revealed that this was “the most difficult sensing session he’d ever done.” He found NCO counseling was not being done, and

⁴⁸ EX 28: Houston Recruiting Battalion Sensing Session Results (Vol 6, Tab 5)

⁴⁹ EX 40: (b)(6), 29 Sep 08 (Vol 4, Tab A)

⁵⁰ EX 41: Palestine Police Department report 9 Aug 08, p.2 (Vol 3, Tab 16)

⁵¹ EX 42: (b)(6), 3 Sep 08 (Vol 3, Tab 8)

⁵² EX 43: BG Turner interview with (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 5); EX 44: BG Turner interview with (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 10)

⁵³ EX 45: (b)(6), p. 3 (Vol 8, Tab 1)

⁵⁴ EX 28: Houston Recruiting Battalion Sensing Session Results (Vol 6, Tab 5)

⁵⁵ EX 46: (b)(6), p.1 (Vol 8, Tab 13)

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79Rs routinely made verbal threats to send low-producing recruiters back to the “mainstream Army.” Many recruiters feared reprisal for talking to the EO NCO. Those in (b)(6) and (b)(6) Company “would not say a word” during the session. Many believed the only way to present grievances or issues to their chain of command was to have their spouses call the battalion commander.⁵⁶

(4) Many recruiters described a leadership style that relied heavily on intimidation and threats. Threats include relief from duties, sending a recruiter back to the “mainstream Army,” taking away time off, and poor performance evaluations.⁵⁷ (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(5) There is ample evidence of leaders belittling NCOs in public, in front of subordinates, stating that certain NCOs were failures, certain NCOs should never have been promoted, etc.⁵⁹ (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(6) Remedial training was often seen as punitive and demeaning. “Zero roller” training was “always a beat down session”; recruiters “always came back distraught, upset” ... “almost never a training event.” (b)(7)b

(b)(7)b

d. Ineffective Recruiter Training.

(b)(7)b, (b)(6)

(b)(7)b, (b)(6)

⁵⁶ EX 28: Houston Recruiting Battalion Sensing Session Results (Vol 6, Tab 5); EX 47: BG Turner interview with (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 9)

⁵⁷ EX 47: BG Turner interview with (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 9); EX 48: BG Turner interview with (b)(6) (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 11); EX 44: BG Turner interview with (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 10); EX 30: Results of Crisis Response Team Visit to the Houston Battalion (Vol 5, Tab 1)

⁵⁸ EX 49: E-mail between (b)(6) and (b)(6), 13 Jun 08 (Vol 6, Tab R)

⁵⁹ E.g., EX 48: BG Turner interview with (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 11); EX 36: (b)(6), 27 Oct 08, pp. 4-8, (Vol 5, Tab E); EX 50: (b)(6) (Vol 6, Tab I); EX 51: (b)(6) 20 Oct 08 (Vol 5, Tab K)

⁶⁰ EX 43: BG Turner interview with (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 5)

⁶¹ EX 48: BG Turner interview with (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 11); EX 44: BG Turner interview with (b)(6), Vol 5, Tab 10); EX 43: BG Turner interview with (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 5); EX 30: Results of Crisis Response Team Visit to the Houston Battalion, (Vol 5, Tab 1)

⁶² “Zero Roller” refers to an unsuccessful recruiter who enlists “zero” prospects in a month.

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(b)(7)b, (b)(6)

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(b)(7)b, (b)(6)

(7) SFC Flores killed himself six days later.

- ⁷¹ EX 36: (b)(6), 27 Oct 08, p.2 (Vol 5, Tab E)
- ⁷² EX 35: (b)(6) 28 Oct 08, p.2 (Vol 5, Tab B);
- ⁷³ EX 35: (b)(6) 28 Oct 08, p. 3 (Vol 5, Tab B)
- ⁷⁴ EX 36: (b)(6), 27 Oct 08, pp. 4-6, 8 (Vol 5, Tab E)
- ⁷⁵ EX 50: (b)(6) (Vol 6, Tab I); EX 53: (b)(6) (Vol 6, Tab D)
- ⁷⁶ EX 51: (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab K); EX 59: (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab Y); EX 60: (b)(6) interview w/SSG (b)(6) (Vol 6, Tab 8); EX 61: (b)(6) (Vol 6, Tab 1) (b)(6) told him "you can't lead shit")
- ⁷⁷ EX 36: (b)(6) 27 Oct 08, p. 6 (Vol 5, Tab E); EX 50: (b)(6), p.3 (Vol 6, Tab I); EX 62: SSG (b)(6) Vol 3, Tab 8); EX 45: (b)(6) p.2 (Vol 3, Tab 9)
- ⁷⁸ EX 50: (b)(6) p. 3 (Vol 6, Tab I); EX 63: (b)(6) (Vol 3, Tab 8)
- ⁷⁹ EX 36: (b)(6) 27 Oct 08, p. 8 (Vol 5, Tab E)
- ⁸⁰ EX 62: (b)(6) (Vol 3, Tab 8); EX 64: (b)(6) 4 Sep 08 (Vol 3, Tab 10); EX 65: (b)(6) 4 Sep 08 (Vol 3, Tab 10); EX 45: (b)(6), p. 2 (Vol 3, Tab 9)
- ⁸¹ EX 62: (b)(6) (Vol 3, Tab 8); EX 66: (b)(6) (Vol 3, Tab 8)("he was not the same when he returned")

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e. Recruiting Mission. Current policy for the assignment of USAREC's contract mission is prescribed in UR 601-73, Missioning Procedures, 19 August 2008, which was a major revision of the previous version, dated 31 July 1999. The 1999 version described a formal process of mission being assigned from USAREC Headquarters down through the brigades, battalions, companies and stations to the recruiter. According to Appendix D, each recruiter signed for his or her mission on a USAREC Form 711-2, co-signed by the recruiting station commander.

Though it can't be documented by a change to the regulation, sometime during 2002-2003 USAREC adopted a "Station Missioning" policy that stopped a formal mission assignment to the recruiter. Instead, the recruiters in a station were "goaled" to produce enough contracts to meet the station mission. Both the 1999 and current version of UR 601-73 state "commanders will not ... place operational missions in excess of the assigned mission to their subordinates". The 1999 version specifically assigns responsibility to the Recruiting Brigade Commander to ensure that the assignment of the recruiting brigade's contract mission is down to the recruiter level" and states that the mission must "zero-sum" at each level. The intent is to prohibit commanders at intermediate levels from "bumping" up the mission they assign to their subordinates to ensure the higher level command's success at the expense of the subordinates.

Regular Army recruiters in the Houston Battalion told me they had a mission to write two contracts per month, with at least one of those contracts being a "quality" recruit (high school graduate who scores in the upper half of the AFQT). Interviews with (b)(6), (b)(6), (b)(6) (5th Brigade (b)(6)) and (b)(6) reveal that this has been a brigade policy since about December 2003.⁸² (b)(6) said he "operationalized" the mission to the "two volume / one quality" contracts standard to "get everybody producing ... to establish a work ethic". The brigade policy is detailed in their Prospecting Directive. This practice has the effect of levying a mission on the recruiters in excess of the brigade and battalion missions. For example, the table below shows the number of on-production recruiters, and the volume and quality missions for both 5th Brigade and the Houston Recruiting Battalion for July 2008:

	Recruiter Data			Mission Data (after adjudication)			
	Authorized	Assigned	Foxhole	Grad-Alpha	Senior-Alpha	All Others	Volume
5th Brigade	1471	1490	1376	978	461	872	2311
Houston Battalion	217	226	201	139	66	138	343

The brigade only had a volume mission of 2311, yet the recruiters collectively "felt" a mission of 2752 contracts (1376 "foxhole recruiters" X 2 contracts). Houston battalion had a volume mission of 343, while the mission levied on the recruiters totaled 402.

⁸² EX 67: Record of Phone Conversations with USAREC and 5th Recruiting Brigade Leaders reference Missioning Procedures (Vol 5, Tab 12)

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The recruiter's workload requirements (appointments to be made, conducted and tested, number of prospects to "pass" the required tests, the number of prospects to be "on the floor", etc) is derived to meet the recruiter's mission. (b)(6) review of the Mission Accomplishment Plan (MAP) data in Houston battalion reveals some cases of recruiter workload targets being increased to meet the higher "2/1" mission.

The practice of establishing a "goal" for each recruiter that, in the aggregate, exceeds the battalion or brigade missions artificially increases recruiter workload and work hour requirements beyond what would be expected to meet the actual mission.

(b)(6) provided a copy of a document issued by USAREC HQs titled Transforming US Army Recruiting Command, FY 07 Campaign and Missioning Guide.⁸³ There is no date on the document, but it appears to have been developed around October 2006. (b)(6) USAREC G2, indicated it was a USAREC G2 / G3 product that was briefed at the USAREC Army Leader Training Conference that fall. The Commanding General's letter leads the document with a title "Must Do Two" and gives a rationale that combines the Regular Army and Army Reserve missions as well as adding a "reasonable level of Future Soldier (FS) loss ... that translates into an operational, individual, recruiter mission of two per month." (b)(6) feels this document suggests USAREC HQs endorsed the "2/1" mission concept; however, the specific policies and procedures to assign the actual mission are detailed in the base of the document and USAREC Regulation 601-73. Reliance on the first few pages of the preface of this guide is superficial. The document does add to the confusion on missioning procedures, but does not relieve the brigade commander of his responsibility to "zero sum" missions within his command.

f. Training. The suicide prevention training program in USAREC is described below. There is no evidence of a deficiency in the training program that, if corrected, would have made a difference in any of the cases reviewed.

(1) USAREC requires annual suicide prevention training be done within all units, USAREC Regulation (UR) 350-1, 13 July 2007. USAREC's Annual Training Guidance directs use of the Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST) to address Soldier wellness. USAREC trains suicide prevention at Annual Leader Training Conferences conducted at the command and brigade levels. Leaders down to battalion command teams participate in this training.

(2) Battalion Training. Each USAREC battalion conducts an annual training conference where suicide prevention is conducted for all recruiters in the battalion. The Houston battalion

⁸³ EX 68: Transforming U.S. Army Recruiting Command, FY 07 Campaign and Missioning Guide (Vol 5, Tab 13)

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had most recently conducted this training on 1 August 2008. SFC Flores was present for the training; the sign-in roster does not reflect that SFC Henderson attended.⁸⁴

(3) Suicide prevention training is also offered at the RRS and by its Mobile Training Teams. A list of available training resources is included in the CRT report at Exhibit 33.

(4) CPT Robinson had attended risk management and stress management training during Battalion Safety Stand-down Day, 14 October 2004.⁸⁵ There is no evidence of when he last attended Suicide Prevention Training.

(5) SSG Andersson attended the annual suicide prevention training conducted by Chaplain (b)(6) on 11 November 2006. SSG Anderson's company commander, (b)(6) indicated he personally presented quarterly risk management training to his company; SSG Andersson had most recently attended this training on 12 January 2007.⁸⁶

(6) AR 600-63, Army Health Promotion, requires suicide prevention training for all Soldiers, civilians and leaders. The Retention and Recruiting School (RRS) at Fort Jackson conducts several courses for leaders, specifically: the Recruiting Company Commanders Course (3 weeks), the Station Commanders Course (4 weeks), the Recruiting Company 1st Sergeant Course (3 weeks), the Recruiting Command Sergeant Major Course (2 weeks), and the Pre-Command Course (3 weeks). Only the Station Commanders Course includes any suicide prevention training (10 hours), instituted after CPT Robinson's suicide.

(7) (b)(6) (SSG Andersson's station commander) completed the Station Commanders Course on 14 April 2006 and SFC Flores completed the Station Commanders Course on 18 April 2008, both attending after the suicide prevention training was added. (b)(6) (b)(6) (SFC Henderson's station commander) is scheduled to attend in February 2009. As of the November 2008, 56% of all serving station commanders have attended the course.

8. Institutional factors. This investigation examined several institutional factors that have bearing on the matters tasked in the appointment letter. Specifically, I looked at policies, programs and practices that screen and assign prospective recruiters to USAREC, DA policy on reintegration of redeploying Soldiers (specifically, the mental health assessment procedures); and USAREC's ability to provide access to services typically found on a military installation to their geographically dispersed workforce.

a. Assignment of Personnel to USAREC

⁸⁴ EX 69: Near-Term Training Plan—(b)(6) Co--Safety Stand Down Day, 1 Aug 08 (Vol 3, Tab 23)

⁸⁵ EX 70: Excerpt, Fatality Review Board briefing -- CPT Robinson, 1 Feb 05 (Vol 1)

⁸⁶ EX 43: BG Turner interview w. (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 5); EX 71: Excerpt, Fatality Review Board briefing - SSG Andersson (Vol 2)

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(1) The screening process for selecting recruiters to USAREC duties is outlined in AR 601-1, Assignment of Enlisted Personnel to the Recruiting Command. USAREC G1, the Human Resources Command's (HRC) Special Assignments Branch, and USAREC's Recruiting and Retention School (RRS) collaborate to review eligibility of all Soldiers nominated for recruiting duty. The evaluation process includes:

(a) A voluntary submission of DA Form 5425 Applicant / Nominee Personal Financial Statement (submission is strongly encouraged; a nominee's financial status is checked prior to his / her attendance at the Army Recruiter Course under the DA G1 Personnel Suitability Screening Policy)

(b) A face-to-face interview with the nominee's battalion commander

(c) DA 5427 Company Commander Recruiter Candidate Interview and Assessment

(d) DA 5426 Battalion Command Team Recruiter Candidate Interview and Evaluation

(e) DA 7424 Sensitive Duty Assignment Eligibility Questionnaire, and an Enlisted Record Brief

While the selection criteria require a mental evaluation statement within the past six months, none of the interview / evaluation forms completed by the Soldier's chain of command positively determine that this evaluation has been completed. Additionally, there is no standard evaluation instrument and many of the evaluations are performed in a very superficial manner by someone with no mental health care training. It is generally agreed the current evaluation method is not adequate in assessing an applicant's mental health given the experiences of redeploying Soldiers.

(2) The practice of selection has not been evenly executed over the past several years. (b)(6), Chief, Special Assignments Branch estimates that HRC never receives complete evaluation packets for approximately 40-50% of the Soldiers the branch selects for assignment to USAREC. Regardless, the Soldier is allowed to attend the Army Recruiter Course (administered by the RRS) at Ft Jackson, SC. RRS confirms about the same percentage of Soldiers arrive at the ARC without the required evaluations.

(3) The lack of a mental health assessment requires Center One to conduct mental health risk assessments for all prospective recruiters attending the ARC. (b)(6), USAREC Command Psychologist, estimates that about half of the approximately 300 prospective recruiters attending the RRS each month present some form of self-assessed mental health concerns. However, the Behavioral Health Clinic at Moncrief Army Hospital at Ft Jackson has a capacity to evaluate only 15-30 mental health patients each month, leaving the remainder to be

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evaluated at the Soldier's duty assignment location in USAREC. There is currently no way to ensure the Soldier schedules or receives this follow-on evaluation.

b. Redeployment and Reintegration. Current DA policy mandates all returning Soldiers remain at their losing installation for a minimum 90-day reintegration period. All four victims had remained at their losing installation for at least seven months before being reassigned. However, DA policy also allows for a Soldier to seek a waiver of the 90-day stabilization from the first Lieutenant Colonel commander in their chain. The general belief of mental health specialists I interviewed was that mental health stress symptoms do not present themselves during the initial homecoming and leave periods; all recommended holding Soldiers for at least the 90-day period. During CY2008, twenty (20) Soldiers had the 90-day stabilization period waived to gain assignment to USAREC. On 9 October 2008, the Chief, Special Assignments Branch, HRC, stopped accepting waiver requests for Soldiers nominated for recruiter or drill sergeant duty.

c. Mental Health Assessment. The Post Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) is a self-assessment screening tool administered to Soldiers within 30 days of their departure from theater and no later than 30 days after their redeployment. (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) The Post Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA) screen was initiated 10 March 2005 to ensure identification and treatment of emerging deployment-related health concerns. It is required to be administered to all redeploying Soldiers between 90 and 180 days after redeployment. Full implementation of the PDHRA did not begin until January 2006 and it was not until 1Q07 that at least 50% of redeploying Soldiers completed the PDHRA. (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(1) Discussions with BG Rhonda Cornum, Director, Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, DA G3/5/7 and BG Timothy Adams, Assistant Surgeon General for Force Projection, indicate that implementation of the PDHRA has been steady and over 93% of all Soldiers now complete the PDHRA upon redeployment. The Post Traumatic Stress portion of the PDHRA is a set of four questions Soldiers answer, in person in most cases, and on-line if needed. The answers are screened by a health care professional. If the Soldier answers at least two of the four questions affirmatively, they are considered to be either a "minor" or "major" concern. Concern by the reviewing primary care professional usually results in a referral to a mental health provider.

(2) Currently, no compliance mechanism exists to ensure Soldiers make and keep an appointment with a mental health professional after being given a consult to a Behavioral Health clinic, which may be generated by a provider with "concerns" during his review of the PDHRA. Approximately 13% of all Soldiers who completed the PDHRA in 4Q07 were assessed as either a "minor" or "major" provider concern. Of note, affirmative responses to two or three of the questions has remained steady at about 20% and 12% (respectively) since the PDHRA was

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initiated. During that same period, actual provider-diagnosed PTSD has risen steadily. The current rate of 3.6% is the highest to date since the beginning of the war.

(3) If the Soldier does keep an appointment, the clinical report is now recorded in their Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA) (electronic medical record). However, no tracking system currently exists in MEDPROS to display a Soldier's care after completion of the PDHRA. For a Soldier identified with mental health care needs, the continuity of care "breaks" after the PDHRA screening. There is no "battle hand-off" between the losing and gaining units. Protecting the confidentiality of the patient and reducing stigma are paramount considerations in any solution that has the chain of command enforcing medical care requirements.

d. Access to medical care / services /peer support for geographically dispersed Soldiers. USAREC has Soldiers assigned in 50 states, three territories and three foreign countries. USAREC estimates that 70% of its Soldiers reside more than 50 miles away from a military installation. This presents obvious challenges for Soldiers accessing services in the civilian community that are commonly provided on military installations. Additionally, recruiters assigned outside installation coverage suffer from a lack of peer network support.

(1) Given its relative proximity to several military installations and location near a major urban center, the Houston Recruiting Battalion enjoys ready access to medical care and other services.

(2) Health promotion in the Army, to include suicide prevention programs, is governed by AR 600-63, Army Health Promotion. Senior mission commanders and garrison commanders establish a Community Health Promotion Council (CHPC) to provide a comprehensive approach to health promotion. Suicide prevention programs are implemented under the direction of the CHPCs. The CHP program is primarily an installation-based program. It does not address or prescribe policy guidance for commands that have Soldiers stationed in civilian communities well outside military installation coverage. However, with regard to suicide prevention programs, USAREC has the requisite resources and executes the five overarching strategies typically performed by the CHPC. Resources exist at the command, brigade and battalion levels.

(3) With the exception of the Family Readiness Support Assistants (FRSA), USAREC is adequately resourced to either provide direct support services, or to facilitate access to the same services **if they are offered in the remote site**. Each brigade is authorized a Unit Ministry Team (chaplain and chaplain's assistant), a Soldier and Family Program Manager, a Family Advocacy Program / Sexual Assault Response Coordinator, a Military Family Life Consultant and a Personal Finance Counselor. Psychologist positions are now authorized at each brigade, though they will not be filled until summer 2009. Additionally, each battalion has a Soldier and Family Assistant position authorized.

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(4) The matrix at exhibit 30⁸⁷ shows a cross reference of services available on a military installation and the corresponding support available to geographically dispersed Soldiers. Accessibility to potential support is also facilitated through relatively new DoD and Army on-line programs such as Military OneSource, Army OneSource and the Joint Services Family Assistance Program (JSFAP). JSFAP is an OSD funded effort that assigns a Military OneSource consultant, two Family Life consultants, a Red Cross representative and Transition assistance representative to the state National Guard Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ). Their mission is to facilitate the link-up between a military service / family member and the service provider. Both the breadth of services offered and access to these services has improved; however, awareness amongst leaders, Soldiers and Families is sporadic.

(5) The on-line services and assets available in the brigades and battalions described above can only connect Soldiers to services where they exist. Clearly, levels of support services across the country are uneven. Significantly, (b)(6) indicates there are "white spaces" across the country where access to mental health care is inadequate or nonexistent.

(6) Access to peer support networks. Army OneSource has great potential to be a forum that links the "Army family" together in any given geographic area. It already addresses specific Soldier, veteran, Family, Wounded Warrior and Survivor needs across all three components down to the community level. With some minor improvements, AOS could facilitate a "social network" for the Army "family" in any given location.

9. Findings. The findings presented here pertain to the Houston Recruiting Battalion. Although some inferences can be made to USAREC as a whole, several leaders and recruiters in the battalion commented that their experience in Houston has been unique. These leaders reported to me that other USAREC battalions with which they have served had much better command climates, leadership, quality of life, and training programs.

By a "preponderance of the evidence" standard, I make the following specific findings as they concern the questions posed in my appointment order:

a. Whether any trends or patterns emerge from the four suicides occurring in the Houston Recruiting Battalion since 2005. A review of these suicides as a group did not reveal any trends outside of the failed or failing personal relationships each victim was experiencing at the time of his suicide. While four suicides over 45 months in a unit the size of this recruiting battalion represents a large number of incidents, it is hard to draw any statistical significance from so few events. Each case was different, although there were common factors among the stressors each victim experienced.

⁸⁷ EX 30: Matrix of Soldier and Family Support as of 14 Nov 08, from Results of Crisis Response Team Visit to the Houston Recruiting Bn, 15-24 October 2008 (Vol 5, Tab 1)

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(1) SFC Flores experienced stress brought on by both personal and work-related issues. In the week before his death, he suffered humiliation at work and loss in his personal life.

(2) SFC Henderson also showed evidence of stress, to include work-induced stress, friction in his marriage, and medical issues (b)(3)

(3) While two of the four had been diagnosed with (b)(3) and Houston battalion has seen an increase in number of recruiters requiring medical attention, these challenges are manageable if access to care is readily available. Medical challenges were no more evident than other stressors.

b. Whether assigning personnel recently returned from combat as recruiters has any detrimental impact on personnel or activities.

(1) There is nothing inherently problematic about Soldiers assuming duty as a recruiter following a deployed assignment. The Department of the Army policy for selection of Soldiers for recruiting duty is sound and the selection criteria are comprehensive. However, the policy is not consistently applied. Less than 60% of the applicants are fully vetted. Many Soldiers arrive at the RRS without evidence of a recent mental health evaluation or commander's evaluation. The estimated 150 applicants per month who require mental health care far exceed the treatment capacity at Moncrief Army Community Hospital, resulting in many recruiters continuing on to their recruiting duty assignment in need of care.

(2) Houston battalion has seen an increase in number of recruiters requiring medical attention. These challenges are manageable if access to care is readily available. Medical challenges were no more evident than other stressors. For the most part, the company leadership teams in Houston knew which recruiters were recently returning from deployments and knew of specific medical needs for those recruiters. All indicated that access to medical care was not an issue in the battalion area. There was adequate mental health treatment available through civilian hospitals (through TRICARE) and the battalion made routine use of Brooke Army Medical Center at Ft Sam Houston, TX (approximately 3 hour drive from Houston).

c. Whether the command climate or morale within the battalion was a relevant factor in any of the suicides. (b)(7)b

(b)(7)b (b)(6) professional opinion holds that the two most significant factors in suicide risk are humiliation (particularly for a group such as professional NCOs and officers) and loss (b)(7)b

(b)(7)b

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d. Whether leaders in the unit attempted to interfere with previous investigations or made false official statements. I found no substantiated cases of leaders directly interfering with previous or current investigations; nor, could I substantiate specific utterances of false official statements. However, several individuals perceived they were being “coached” on how to respond to an inquiry. These included the following cases:

(b)(7)b, (b)(6)

(2) On 23 September 2008, (b)(6) was appointed to conduct an investigation of SFC Henderson’s suicide. Some of the Soldiers who provided her statements felt that she was “guiding” them in how to write the statements. I offered each of the Soldiers an opportunity to retract or amend their original statements, but none wished to do so.

(b)(7)b, (b)(6)

e. Whether mass hazing or threatening counseling was used by the chain of command. There were several testimonies to negative leadership practices by leadership in the Houston battalion and its companies. As detailed in several areas of this report, I find that both (b)(6) and (b)(6) employed a leadership style that could reasonably be perceived as threatening or intimidating. (b)(7)b, (b)(6)

(b)(7)b, (b)(6)

(b)(7)b, (b)(6)

. I do not find any evidence of mass hazing, to the extent that hazing is defined as physical or mental abuse inflicted as a ritual or rite of passage.

f. Whether any real or perceived inequalities exist between detailed and permanent recruiters.

(1) There are perceived inequalities, but the nature of the unequal treatment is described differently by the 79R and detailed recruiters. Most characterized any differences as 79Rs being viewed as the “professional” recruiting force and detailed recruiters as “hired help.” Many stated that 79Rs were held to a higher standard and more was expected of them. Several of the detailed recruiters described the 79R cadre as the “USAREC Mafia.” Their comments describe a close-knit clique that many times operates outside the bounds of established policies and accepted

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leadership practices, and closes ranks to protect its members when challenged. Many recruiters, both detailed and career, report they felt a fear of reprisal for any comments or actions that might challenge the “mafia.”

(2) The tendency for some to consider operating outside accepted norms could be occurring due to the longer duration assignments found in USAREC. It is not uncommon for recruiters to be assigned within the same battalion or brigade in excess of five years; in these cases, a group of leaders may come to see themselves as the “de facto” authority in the unit. AR 601-1 includes policy on the Career Recruiter Reassignment Program, establishing maximum tour lengths for how long career recruiters can be assigned to the same battalion and within the same brigade. Currently, USAREC has approximately 10% of their recruiters who have been with the same battalion for over six years (12% for the Houston Recruiting Battalion) and 12% within the same brigade for over eight years. The USAREC CSM is actively enforcing this policy and these levels are significantly lower than in the past.

(3) The CRT reported that there was a dissatisfaction with the leadership of 79Rs. This was reported as a rift between detailed recruiters who had deployed and 79R recruiters who had not. I did not find that any criticism of leadership was based upon a lack of deployment experiences. I found instead a perception that in the 79R community, “rank comes with a ring, not leadership abilities,” meaning that the ability to recruit Soldiers was more valuable than leadership ability.⁸⁸

g. Whether any disciplinary actions are appropriate under the circumstances.

(b)(5), (b)(7)b, (b)(6)

⁸⁸ EX 72: BG Turner interview with (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 14)

⁸⁹ EX 73: BG Turner interview with (b)(6) (Vol 5, Tab 15)

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(b)(5), (b)(7)b, (b)(6)

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(b)(5), (b)(7)b, (b)(6)

h. Whether any systemic solutions should be implemented by USAREC, USAAC, or HQDA. See recommendations in paragraph 10c, below.

10. Recommendations.

a. Command Climate

(1) CG, USAAC direct USAREC to ensure that the Houston Recruiting battalion undergoes another sensing session by the same USAREC Crisis Response Team six months from now to measure changes in recruiter attitudes and perceptions.

(2) CG, USAAC direct USAREC undergo a command-wide external sensing session to assess the climate command wide. Sensing session should include, at a minimum, an assessment of: time-off / duty hour policies, training offered at RRS and unit training, 79R professional development opportunities and leadership within USAREC.

(3) CG, USAAC direct USAREC aggressively educate Soldiers and Families on the services provided at brigade and below, and the services available on-line through Military OneSource, Army OneSource, and others.

b. Personnel. Recommend that you take no disciplinary action at your level, but instead forward the findings and recommendations in paragraph 9g to the CG, USAREC for information and consideration of appropriate action with regard to (b)(6), (b)(7)b

(b)(6), (b)(7)b

c. Systemic

(1) CG, USAAC direct USAREC to perform the following tasks:

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(a) Review and revise, as necessary, its missioning process to ensure subordinate commands and recruiters are not missioned or “goaled” to a recruiting contract mission that exceeds the command’s contract mission. Missioning process regulation should include guidelines for developing MAPS workload requirements to ensure recruiter workload is consistent with assigned mission.

(b) Review and revise, as necessary, policies that temporarily relieve, and subsequently reinstate, a recruiter to active prospecting and recruiting duties after suicide gestures or ideations. Review should specifically address the appropriate level of decision authority and criteria for reinstatement (e.g., battalion commander, but only after consult with the USAREC Command Psychologist).

(c) Conduct a comprehensive review of mission-driven recruiter workload requirements and time-off, duty hour policies to establish command guidelines that balance Soldier and Family needs with mission requirements.

(d) Ensure that all training, particularly that training focused on improving the performance of recruiters not meeting mission, is planned, executed and assessed IAW standard Army Training Management System prescribed in FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training.

(e) Create a professional development career “map” for 79Rs that allows assignment outside of USAREC for purpose of maintaining currency with the operational Army, providing additional leadership opportunities and killing the perception of a “USAREC mafia.” Options to evaluate should include, but not be restricted to, merging 79R and 79S MOSs to allow circulation between USAREC and MTOE units, shortening the maximum tour length times prescribed in AR 601-1 and establishing recruiting as an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI), allowing Soldiers to rotate assignments in their primary MOS and recruiting duty.

(f) Make the following enhancements to its Suicide Prevention Training Program within USAREC:

- Revise the training program at the Army Recruiters Course (ARC) to focus on providing Soldiers with the coping skills necessary to manage the stressors they will likely face during their assignment in USAREC. Specifically, the training should address both “lifetime” stressors (financial, relationship, parenting, etc) and stressors induced uniquely by the USAREC mission (long hours, dealing with young civilians, living away from a military installation, etc).
- Revise the Station Commanders Course to include both suicide risk factor identification and the coping skills training described above.

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- Add training to the Company Commanders and First Sergeants Course focusing primarily -- on suicide risk factors identification.
- Add both suicide prevention training and training focused on establishing a positive command climate to the Pre-Command Course.

(g) Consider availability and adequacy of specific services when assigning recruiters with special needs.

(h) Review and consider recommendations made by the Crisis Response Team at Exhibit 33.

(2) CG USAAC refer this investigation to DA G1 and OTSG for consideration, with the following recommendations:

(a) Take the following actions to improve the screening of prospective candidates for recruiting duty:

- Issue DA-level guidance that reinforces the need to faithfully comply with comprehensive requirements in AR 601-1 for screening and processing applicants for recruiting duty.
- Review and revise, as necessary, the methods and instrument used to evaluate the mental health of prospective recruiters. Consider the development of a standard instrument to be used for mental evaluation.
- Revise the Battalion Command Team Recruiter Candidate Interview and Evaluation form (DA 5426) to positively identify the completion of a mental evaluation for a prospective recruiter

(b) Consider actions to improve the provision of care for Soldiers requiring mental health care:

- Implement a system that establishes positive control over any Soldier that screens as a “provider concern” during the PDHRA or mental evaluation used for recruiter screening. Ensure “screened” Soldiers conduct face-to-face appointment with mental health care professional before departing the unit. Ensure health care providers record consult in AHLTA and unit personnel make appropriate entries in MEDPROS.
- Investigate and implement policies to provide for continuity of care while protecting the Soldier’s right to confidential medical care. Once diagnosed with medical condition

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requiring extended care, MEDCOM should facilitate the provision of care for the Soldier-- either at a military installation or TRICARE provider.

(c) DA review policy of allowing redeploying Soldiers to seek waiver of the 90-day stabilization period.

(d) Review Suicide Prevention Training to ensure the proper balance of training focused on identification of suicide risk factors in others / intervention and training focused on building resiliency by providing each Soldier the skills required to cope with the myriad stressors they may experience. "Coping skills" training aimed at improving Soldiers' resiliency in managing stressors should be developmental throughout a Soldier's career ... included in certain professional schools and unit training and focused on the typical personal and professional stressors (medical, financial, relationships, parenting, mental health, job-specific, etc) an individual typically faces.

(f) Continue improvements to the Army OneSource program to improve the "social network" capabilities of the web-site, particularly for those Soldiers assigned to communities away from military installations. Soldiers and Families should be able to network with all Army units, agencies, services in a local area and potentially include non-military individuals and agencies that seek to support local Soldiers and Families.

11. Point of contact for this investigation is the undersigned at (b)(6)



F. D. Turner
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Deputy Commanding General
and Chief of Staff